国内引资竞争视角下中央政府调控效应分析——基于FDI竞争理论框架  

An Analysis of the Effect of Central Government's Regulation from the Perspective of Competition on Domestic Investment Invitation:Based on the FDI Competition Theory

作　　者：刘超 郑忱阳 Chao Liu;Chenyang Zheng

机构地区：[1]对外经济贸易大学国际经济贸易学院

出　　处：《国际税收》2020年第6期66-73,共8页International Taxation In China

基　　金：国家社科基金重点项目“国有企业分类改革的理论逻辑与实施路径研究”(16AJY010)的阶段性研究成果。

摘　　要：本文在"企业竞拍战"模型中引入中央政府因素,将其拓展为一国国内FDI税收竞争模型,以分析地方政府引资竞争的福利影响和中央政府的最优调控政策。本文模型分析表明:当地方引资竞争不存在时,中央政府没有动机采取差异化的调控政策;当地方引资竞争存在时,中央政府能够通过制定非对称税收政策抑制可能发生的"逐底竞争",从而使国家福利达到最大。若将区际公平纳入考虑,中央政府通过设计纵向配套转移支付机制,可提高竞争双方的福利水平,降低地方引资竞争导致的福利损失。This paper introduces the central government factor into the H-W model and expands it into domestic FDI tax competition model of one country, so as to analyze welfare impact of local government investment invitation competition and optimal policy of central government. The theoretical model shows that central government has no incentive to apply differentiated regulation policies when local competition for investment invitation does not exist. However, as the competition arising, the asymmetric tax policies formulated by the central government can suppress the possible "race to the bottom" so as to maximize national welfare. If taking inter-regional equity into consideration, the central government can increase the welfare level of both competitors and reduce the welfare loss by designing a vertical supporting transfer payment mechanism.

关 键 词：外商直接投资 税收竞争 企业竞拍战 中央政府调控 地方政府策略互动 帕累托改进 

分 类 号：F810.42[经济管理—财政学]