大股东控制力、业绩补偿承诺与关联并购价值创造——基于股东关系联盟的新测算  

Controlling Power of Large Shareholder,Performance Compensation Commitment and Value Creation of Related M&A:New Measurement Based on Shareholder Relationship Alliance

作　　者：简冠群 JIAN Guan-qun

机构地区：[1]甘肃政法大学经济管理学院

出　　处：《中央财经大学学报》2020年第7期58-70,共13页Journal of Central University of Finance & Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目“我国创业板上市公司控制权配置、经理管理防御与成长性研究”(项目编号:71772151);甘肃政法大学校级重大科研项目(项目编号:GZF2019XZD02)。

摘　　要：基于股东关系联盟的大股东实际控制力新测算为揭示大股东资产注入及盈利承诺动机提供了有效的逻辑支撑。本文在探究大股东实际控制力与资产注入价值创造间逻辑关系的基础上,考察了业绩承诺的中介作用。运用均值检验和层级回归分析结果表明:大股东相对控制力对资产注入后价值创造具有U型影响,绝对控制力对资产注入后价值创造具有倒U型影响;业绩承诺对资产注入后价值创造具有倒U型影响;大股东相对控制力对业绩承诺具有负向影响,绝对控制力对业绩承诺具有正向影响;业绩承诺在大股东控制力与公司价值创造间具有部分中介作用。进一步分析发现,关系股东权力配置对大股东控制力的贡献是资本市场异象的关键诱因。研究结论不仅能够解释不同控制权配置效率的差异,而且能够为资产注入业绩承诺制度安排及控制权配置的优化设计提供靶向指导。The new measurement of the actual control power of the large shareholders based on the shareholder relationship alliance provides an effective logic support for revealing the motivation of large shareholders asset injection and earnings commitment.On the basis of exploring the logical relationship between the actual control power of large shareholders and asset injection value creation,this paper examines the mediating role of performance commitment.Using mean test and hierarchical regression analysis,the results show that:the relative control power of large shareholder has U type influence on value creation after asset injection,and absolute control force has inverted U type influence on value creation after asset injection;performance commitment has an inverted U effect on value creation after asset injection;the relative control power of large shareholders has a negative impact on performance commitment,and absolute control force has a positive impact on performance commitment;performance commitment plays a partial mediating role between the controlling power of large shareholders and the creation of corporate value.Further analysis shows that the contribution of the power allocation of the shareholders to the controlling power of the large shareholders is the key cause of the anomalies of the capital market.The conclusion of the study can not only explain the difference of different control allocation efficiency,but also can provide targeted guidance into the performance commitment system arrangement and the optimal allocation of control rights.

关 键 词：股东关系 大股东控制力 业绩补偿承诺 资产注入 价值创造 

分 类 号：F275.5[经济管理—企业管理]