双重低碳营销补贴下供应链策略的演化博弈  

Evolutionary Game of Low-carbon Investment in Supply Chain Under Dual Subsidy to Low-carbon Marketing

作　　者：徐咏梅[1] 李益梅 银新逸 Xu Yongmei;Li Yimei;Yin Xinyi(Jinan University,Guangzhou 510632,China)

机构地区：[1]暨南大学,广东广州510632

出　　处：《科技管理研究》2020年第12期211-219,共9页Science and Technology Management Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目“基于多参照点的库存和供应链行为决策研究”(71572070)。

摘　　要：在政府给予制造商、零售商以及制造商给予零售商的双重低碳营销补贴背景下,考虑由上游制造商与下游零售商组成的二级供应链,研究供应链的减排活动及低碳营销问题,建立上下游企业以推动低碳产品流动为目标的低碳投入演化博弈模型,探讨上下游企业低碳投入行为的演化稳定策略。研究结果表明:制造商与零售商的低碳策略与双方低碳投入收益比和政府补贴密切相关,当低碳投入收益比和政府补贴不断变化时,出现多种演化稳定均衡。进一步针对低碳投入中零售商的“搭便车”行为问题分析制造商低碳营销补贴机制下的演化博弈结果,并探讨补贴激励的适用条件。In the context of the dual low-carbon marketing subsidy given by the government to manufacturers,retailers and manufacturers to retailers,considering the secondary supply chain composed of upstream manufacturers and downstream retailers,this paper studies the emission reduction activities and low-carbon marketing in supply chain,establishes a low-carbon input evolution game model for upstream and downstream enterprises to promote the flow of low-carbon products,and discusses the evolution and stability strategy of low-carbon input behavior of upstream and downstream enterprises.The results show that the low-carbon strategy of manufacturers and retailers is closely related to the low-carbon input income ratio of both sides and government subsidies,when the income ratio of lowcarbon input and government are constantly changing,there are many kinds of evolution stable equilibrium.In this paper,we analyze the evolution game result of low-carbon marketing subsidy mechanism and discuss the applicable conditions of subsidy incentive.Further,the paper aims at the problem of"hitchhiking"behavior of retailers in lowcarbon investment,analyzes the evolutionary game results under the mechanism of low-carbon marketing subsidy of manufacturers,and discusses the applicable conditions of subsidy incentive.

关 键 词：供应链 低碳经济 双重补贴 演化博弈 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理] F224[经济管理—国民经济]