以旧换新的两阶段闭环供应链博弈策略分析  

Analysis on the Game Strategy of Two-stage Closed-loop Supply Chain with Trade-in

作　　者：司凤山[1] 王晶[1] 戴道明[1] 王娟[2] SI Fengshan;WANG Jing;DAI Daoming;WANG Juan(School of Management Science and Engineering,Anhui University of Finance and Economics,Bengbu 233030,China;不详)

机构地区：[1]安徽财经大学管理科学与工程学院,安徽蚌埠233030 [2]北京跟踪与通信技术研究所,北京100094

出　　处：《武汉理工大学学报（信息与管理工程版）》2020年第3期221-226,共6页Journal of Wuhan University of Technology：Information & Management Engineering

基　　金：安徽省高校人文社科研究重点项目(SK2020A0025);安徽省高校自然科学研究重点项目(KJ2019A0662)。

摘　　要：为了探究协调机制和系统稳定性对制造商和零售商最优策略的影响,针对再制造产品的以旧换新问题构建两阶段闭环供应链博弈模型,从单阶段和多阶段博弈的角度分析制造商和零售商最优策略的存在条件,设计协调机制实现收益分享,并采取非线性动力学理论讨论系统的稳定性及其演化行为。结果表明:无协调机制下存在最优的废品回收价格系数使得制造商利润最大;协调机制下存在最优的政府补贴标准使得零售商利润最大;无论是否存在协调机制,提高废品回收价格系数对零售商总有利,提高政府补贴标准对制造商总有利;在稳定系统中,价格和利润通过长期策略调整都会收敛于均衡态。In order to explore the influence of coordination mechanism and system stability on the optimal strategy of manufacturers and retailers,a two-stage closed-loop supply chain game model is constructed for the remanufactured products′trade in with old products.The existence conditions of the optimal strategy of manufacturers and retailers are analyzed from the perspective of single-stage and multi-stage games.The coordination mechanism is designed to realize revenue sharing,and the nonlinear dynamics theory is adopted to discuss the stability and evolution behavior of the system.The results show that there is an optimal price coefficient of waste recycling without coordination mechanism to maximize the profit of manufacturers;there is an optimal government subsidy standard under coordination mechanism to maximize the profit of retailers.Whether there is a coordination mechanism or not,improving the price coefficient of waste recycling is always beneficial to retailers and improving the government subsidy standard is always beneficial to manufacturers.In a stable system,price and profit will converge to equilibrium through long-term strategy adjustment.

关 键 词：两阶段闭环供应链 以旧换新 协调机制 稳定性 博弈策略 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]