工资议价能力与员工持股计划  

Wage Bargaining Power and Employee Stock Ownership Plan

作　　者：任灿灿[1] 郭泽光[1] REN Can-can;GUO Ze-guang(School of Accounting,Shanxi University of Finance and Economics,Taiyuan 030006,China)

机构地区：[1]山西财经大学会计学院,山西太原030006

出　　处：《统计学报》2020年第3期77-93,共17页Journal of Statistics

基　　金：教育部哲学社会科学系列发展报告项目(11JBGP014);山西省“1331工程”重点创新团队建设计划(晋教科[2017]12号)。

摘　　要：以2014-2017年的A股上市公司为样本,考察了工资议价能力对员工持股计划的影响。研究发现:工资议价能力越强,企业实施员工持股计划的可能性就越大,员工持股比例也越高,这一现象主要存在于非国有企业和具有较高人才专用性的企业中;工资议价能力会影响员工持股计划中的资金来源和股票来源,议价能力越强,企业越倾向于选择大股东提供借款的资金来源方式和二级市场认购的股票来源方式。进一步的研究显示,员工持股计划是对传统股权激励的有效补充,相比于高管议价能力,员工整体和非高管议价能力更能影响员工持股计划中的参与人员规模、锁定期和持股比例分配,即员工持股计划具有"金手铐"功能,能够显著降低员工离职数。Based on the sample of A-share listed companies from 2014 to 2017, this paper studied the relationship between wage bargaining power and employee stock ownership plan(ESOP). We found that, stronger wage bargaining power was more likely to urge ged companies to implement ESOP, where staff would have higher shareholding ratio. The phenomenon mainly existed in non-stateowned companies and other companies with higher talent specificity. Furthermore, wage bargaining power had affected the sources of funds and stocks in the implementation of ESOP. Enterprises, with stronger bargaining power, were more likely to loan form large shareholders and to subscribe stocks from secondary markets. Further research showed that, ESOP was an effective replenishment to traditional equity incentive. Compared with the bargaining power of managers, ESOP can significantly reduce the amount of resigned employee, because ESOP had greater impact on the participation scale, lockup period and shareholding ratio distribution of participants.

关 键 词：工资议价能力 员工持股计划 资金来源 股票来源 股权激励 

分 类 号：F275.5[经济管理—企业管理]