强制分红政策与公司代理成本:博弈模型与DID检验  

Mandatory Dividend Policy and Corporate Agency Cost:Game Model and DID Test

作　　者：秦海林 张婧旭 QIN Hailin;ZHANG Jingxu(School of Economics and Management, Tianjin University of Technology, Tianjin 300387, China)

机构地区：[1]天津工业大学经济与管理学院金融系,天津300387 [2]天津工业大学经济与管理学院,天津300387

出　　处：《审计与经济研究》2020年第3期81-92,共12页Journal of Audit & Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(71371136);天津市社科规划项目(TJYY13-019,TJYY17-010)。

摘　　要：不同于公司自觉的现金分红行为,强制分红政策在矫正公司分红行为的同时,会激起高管的消极抵制,所以它能否有效降低公司代理成本,尚难预料。为此,建立了一个混合策略完全信息静态博弈,说明了强制分红政策影响代理成本的作用机制,并将2011年出台的强制分红政策视为一个准自然实验,实证检验强制分红政策能否降低上市公司的代理成本。实证研究发现,强制分红政策能够显著抑制企业的代理成本。异质性检验结果表明,相对于中小板和微股利的上市公司而言,强制分红政策可以更加显著地降低那些主板上市公司和正常发放股利的公司的代理成本。研究结果不仅支持了股利代理成本理论,而且为进一步完善公司股利政策和保护中小股东权益提供了经验证据。Different from the conscious cash dividend behavior of the company,the mandatory dividend policy can not only correct the dividend behavior of the company,but also arouse the negative resistance of the executives.Therefore,it is difficult to predict whether it can effectively reduce the agency cost of the company.In this regard,this paper uses mixed strategy and complete information static game to explain the mechanism of mandatory dividend policy affecting agency cost,and takes the mandatory dividend policy introduced in 2011 as a quasi-natural experiment to test whether mandatory dividend policy can reduce the agency cost of listed companies.Empirical research finds that mandatory dividend policy significantly inhibits the agency cost of enterprises.Heterogeneity test shows that mandatory dividend-sharing policy has a better effect on reducing agency costs for companies listed on the motherboard and companies with normal dividends,but it has no significant effect on restraining agency costs for companies with micro-dividends and small and medium-sized boards.This study supports the dividend agency cost theory and provides empirical evidence for capital market to further improve dividend policy and protect minority shareholders.

关 键 词：强制分红政策 代理成本 公司股利政策 混合策略纳什均衡 DID模型 股东权益 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]