低效工业用地再开发的政策困境及建议——基于政企博弈视角  

The Dilemma of Inefficient Industrial Land Redevelopment Policy and Recommendations:Based on the Game Theory of Government and Enterprise

作　　者：唐鹏 何雅萍 TANG Peng;HE Ya-ping(School of Public Administration,Sichuan University,Chengdu 610065,China;School of Public Administration,Hunan University,Changsha 410006,China)

机构地区：[1]四川大学公共管理学院土地资源与房地产管理系,四川成都610065 [2]湖南大学公共管理学院,湖南长沙410082

出　　处：《广东土地科学》2020年第1期32-38,共7页Guangdong Land Science

摘　　要：地方政府和低效企业作为低效工业用地再开发过程中的两大核心主体,厘清二者的利益博弈机制有利于更好地推动政企协作,破解当前再开发政策设计的困境。在中央鼓励低效用地再开发的政策背景下,采用博弈方法,探讨影响政企博弈结果的因素和机理,并以温江区某一典型企业为例进行实证分析。研究表明:低效企业的经济实力、其对土地未来收益的预期、地方政府的激励手段及其收回土地给予的补偿4个因素会影响政企博弈行为,进而影响工业用地再开发的强度。因此,地方政府应多角度地制定引导型、创新型、需求型政策,提高企业响应的积极性。同时,企业也应转变经营发展思路,实现低效工业用地更高效率的再开发。Clarifying the interest game mechanism between the local governments and inefficient enterprises,as the two core entities in the process of re-development of inefficient industrial land,is conducive to promoting the cooperation,and cracking the current dilemma of redevelopment policy design.In the context of the encouraging re-development policy from the central government,this study uses the game method to explore the factors affecting the outcome of the game between government and enterprises,and empirical analysis by using an example which is a typical low-efficiency enterprise in Wenjiang District.The results show that the four factors including inefficient enterprises’ economic strength,local government incentives,inefficient companies’ expectations of future land returns,and compensation paid by local government for land acquisition will affect the game results and the redevelopment intensity of industrial land.Therefore,local governments should formulate guiding,innovative and demand-oriented policies from multiple angles.Besides,enterprises should change their business development ideas and achieve more efficient redevelopment of inefficient industrial land.

关 键 词：土地再开发 政策困境 政企博弈 

分 类 号：F27[经济管理—企业管理]