经营村庄:权责视野下的基层政府经营行为研究——以陈村“土地增减挂钩”项目为例  

Managing the Village:A Study on the Management Behavior of Gr assroots Government from the Perspective of Powers and Responsibilities--the Case of the Project of“L inking the Increase of Urban Construction L and to the Increase of Rural Construction Land"in Chencun Village

作　　者：张伯宸 刘威[1,2] Zhang Bochen;Liu Wei(Department of Sociology,Jilin University,Changchun 130012)

机构地区：[1]吉林大学社会学系 [2]吉林大学东北振兴发展研究院,吉林130012

出　　处：《浙江社会科学》2020年第8期62-73,157,共13页Zhejiang Social Sciences

基　　金：吉林大学青年学术骨干支持计划(编号:2019FRGG02);教育部哲学社会科学研究重大课题攻关项目“打好防范化解重大风险、精准脱贫、污染防治攻坚战研究”(编号:18JZD031)。

摘　　要：通过将过往研究中的"利益-经营"理论视角转换为"权力-责任"分析框架,考察陈村"土地增减挂钩"项目运作的具体过程,获取各个主体在"经营村庄"过程中的行动逻辑,从而探索"经营村庄"得以持续的内在机制。研究发现,在"经营村庄"过程中,"县-乡-村"三者虽然权责失调,但仍以权责"捆绑"的"互倚"结构持续运行。乡镇政权并不似"协调型政权"论者所述,在项目运作中处于"附庸"地位,只作为"项目撮合"过程中提供各种媒介发生作用的场域而存在,而是利用"权力汲取"与"责任转嫁"所形成的惯性带动县域各主体间权力与责任的相互织连,使"县-乡-村"三者的权责"互倚"结构得以延续,让自身在项目运作与资源配置中获取一定的主动权。这一"互倚"结构使县乡政府在项目亏损的情况下仍不断将项目资源投入村庄,并在项目完结后保持着对村庄的经营。基层政府对村庄的经营超越了"‘谋利型经营者’追求利益最大化"的固有假设。By transforming the theoretical perspective of "interest-management" in previous researches into the analytical framework of "power-responsibility", this paper probes into the specific operation of "linking the increase of urban construction land to the increase of rural construction land" in Chencun Village,and obtains the action logic of each subject during the process of "managing the village", so as to explore the internal mechanism of sustainably "managing the village". According to this paper, during the process of"managing the village", although there is an imbalance of powers and responsibilities among "county, township and village", yet the three administrative units still operate continuously with the "interdependent"structure of "bundled" powers and responsibilities. Instead of being in the "vassal" position in project operation and existing only as a field where various media bring their functions into play in the process of "project matchmaking" as maintained by the theory of "coordinated regime", the township regime utilizes the inertia formed by "power absorption" and "responsibility transfer" to drive the interweaving of powers and responsibilities among the subjects at the county level, so as to continue the "interdependent" structure of powers and responsibilities among "county, township and village" and gain an initiative in project operation and resource allocation. Due to such "interdependent" structure, the governments at the county and township levels continue to invest project resources into the village and maintain the management of the village after the completion of these projects even though these projects are uneconomic. The grass-roots government’s management of villages overthrows the inherent assumption that "profit-making operators pursue the maximization of profits".

关 键 词：经营村庄 项目制 地方政府行为 权力汲取 权责互倚结构 

分 类 号：D422.6[政治法律—政治学] F321.1[政治法律—国际共产主义运动]