朝向更完整的实在性概念:胡塞尔与舍勒论实在与还原  

Towards a More Complete Conception of Reality:Husserl and Scheler on Reality and Reduction

作　　者：王嘉新 Wang Jiaxin

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学人文社会科学学院

出　　处：《哲学研究》2020年第7期109-117,129,共10页Philosophical Research

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目“《马克斯·舍勒全集》翻译与研究”(编号17ZDA033)的阶段性成果。

摘　　要：胡塞尔的意识现象学与舍勒的生命形而上学表面上泾渭分明,但实际上,围绕着舍勒后期在实在性问题上对胡塞尔的批评,两者的工作缠绕在了一起。本文重新分析与检讨了舍勒在《唯心论与实在论》中针对胡塞尔所作的批评,以此说明,舍勒基于自己的实在理论对胡塞尔的批评是外在的,胡塞尔对意向性的生成分析是主体性视角下对实在性理论的贡献。同时,现象学还原也不构成胡塞尔和舍勒的实在性理论相互兼容的障碍。无论从有效意义出发还是从生命-抗阻出发理解实在性,其根本差别也只是在于方法论的视角的限制而非立场的相互冲突。胡塞尔的“原意见”和舍勒的“实在体验”等概念显示出的相互指引关系,表明二者可以共同组成一种更完整的现象学实在性理论。Husserl’s phenomenology of consciousness and Scheler’s metaphysics of life are’seemingly distinct.However,Scheler’s criticism of Husserl concerning the issue of reality entangles their approaches.It will be argued here that Scheler’s criticism of Husserl is based on his own theory of Being-real(Realsein)and is extrinsic to Husserl’s position.Husserl’s phenomenological reduction does not constitute a barrier to entering into Scheler’s theory of reality.The fundamental difference between the two philosophers is the limitation of the methodological perspective rather than their contradictory positions.Husserl’s Urdoxa,Scheler’s Realit tserlebnis,and other concepts can be understood in their mutual references,meaning that both positions can be regarded as indispensable modules in a more complete phenomenological theory of reality.

关 键 词：还原 抗阻 如是存在 此在 

分 类 号：B516.52[哲学宗教—外国哲学]