动物伦理学中的康德式义务论  

On Kantian Deontological Theories in Animal Ethics

作　　者：张会永[1] ZHANG Huiyong

机构地区：[1]厦门大学哲学系,福建厦门361005

出　　处：《学术月刊》2020年第8期56-66,82,共12页Academic Monthly

摘　　要：康德的动物伦理观认为,非人动物由于没有理性本性,不能成为一个人格从而拥有道德地位,因此,人对动物并不负有直接的道德义务;但是出于人的德性培养和完善的需要,人需要对动物负有间接义务。他的这种观点被许多批评者贴上理性中心主义、人类中心主义和物种主义的标签并加以拒斥。为了回应这些批评,伍德和科斯嘉德等当代康德主义者,试图通过批判并修正康德伦理学中的“理性”“人格”和“自在目的”等概念,建构关于动物的康德式直接义务论。而奥尼尔、丹尼斯和凯恩等人则通过强调康德“人是目的”“道德情感”和“道德人类学”等理论的重要性,为康德的间接义务论辩护。其实,争论双方共同分享了一个值得商榷的前提,即直接义务与间接义务是不能兼容的。通过探讨康德被争论双方忽视的“双关性”概念,可以发现,康德的间接义务论能够容纳一种特殊形式的直接义务论,从而能够为当代动物伦理学的发展提供有益的借鉴。Kant’s view on animals holds that human beings have no direct duties to animals,because they have no rational natures and cannot be persons,but human beings have duties regarding them,because these duties are necessary for human beings to cultivate their virtues.This view is demonstrated by many commenters as logocentrism,anthropocentrism and speciesism.In order to response these objections,Wood and Korsgaard attempt to construct Kantian direct duties to animals by amending Kant’s concepts such as reason,person and end in itself,while O’Neill,Denis,Altman and Kain try to defend Kant’s indirect duties regarding animals through emphasizing Kant’s concepts such as Humanity,moral feeling and moral anthropology.This article will point out that these commenters share a questionable premise,that is,it is incompatible between direct and indirect duties,and argues that Kant’s concept of amphiboly can help us to connect these two kinds of duties,which is also helpful for us to construct modern animal ethics.

关 键 词：康德 动物伦理 直接义务 间接义务 双关性 

分 类 号：B5[哲学宗教—外国哲学]