高管任期与企业社会责任--基于“职业生涯忧虑”的研究视角  

Executive Tenure and Corporate Social Responsibility:From the Perspective of Career Concerns

作　　者：林宏妹 陈选娟 吴杰楠 LIN Hong-mei;CHEN Xuan-juan;WU Jie-nan(School of Finance,Shanghai University of Finance and Economics,Shanghai,200433,China)

机构地区：[1]上海财经大学金融学院,上海200433

出　　处：《经济管理》2020年第8期51-67,共17页Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )

基　　金：上海财经大学中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金“税收激励与企业创新--基于中国上市高新技术企业专利申请的数据”(2019110254)。

摘　　要：高管是企业社会责任行为的决策者,但现有研究局限于高管背景特征,忽略了高管任期不同阶段对企业社会责任的动态影响。本文以2010-2018年我国A股上市公司为样本,实证检验高管在任期不同阶段对企业社会责任的影响。研究发现:(1)高管在任职初期对企业社会责任有显著的负向影响。(2)高管正常离任时,离任前一年对企业社会责任的影响显著为负;高管非正常离任时,离任前一年对企业社会责任并无显著的负向影响。(3)股权集中度对高管任期的影响有显著的调节作用,第一大股东持股比例较低的公司,高管任职初期和离任前一年对社会责任的不利影响更为显著。本文的研究结论揭示了高管任期不同阶段对社会责任的影响差异,丰富了企业社会责任影响因素的相关研究。Corporate social responsibility(CSR)has received widespread public attention.In recent years,CSR has also become a hot topic in academic research.The commitment of CSR depends on executives,but existing research focuses only on the executive background and ignores the dynamic impact of executive tenure on CSR.Executives are decision makers and executors of CSR,and are one of the important internal factors that affect corporate social responsibility performance.Fama(1980)First raised the issue of managerial career concerns.Because of“career concerns,”managers work hard in the early stage of their tenure and slack when they are close to leaving.For example,CEO will hide bad news at the beginning of his tenure in order to obtain Long-term benefits.CEO will also hide bad news in the year before he leaves to improve reputation,obtain higher compensation benefits and better career development.In the Long run,R&D investment can bring economic benefits and reputation.However,these benefits cannot be enjoyed when executives are close to leaving.Therefore,CEO will have a strong incentive to reduce R&D and advertising expenditure at the end of his tenure,so as to improve company profitability and bonus(Liu and Liu,2007).It can be seen that,driven by career development and economic benefits,executives will take different strategic decisions at different stages of their tenure.This paper holds that executives have a strong“career anxiety”in early and late stage of their tenure,and tend to improve company performance.At this time,as CSR is not compulsory,executives choose to ignore corporate social responsibility performance.This paper divides executive departures into normal departures and abnormal departures.If executives leave normally,they will anticipate their departure time in advance and be able to make decisions that are conducive to their career development in the year before leaving.If executives leave abnormally,they cannot predict the departure time and cannot make arrangements in advance.This paper uses Ch

关 键 词：高管任期 企业社会责任 职业生涯忧虑 股权集中度 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理]