高管股权激励、金融背景与企业金融化  

Executive Equity Incentive,Financial Background and Corporate Financialization

作　　者：谢罗奇[1] 刘佳豪 XIE Luo-qi;LIU Jia-hao(Business School of Xiangtan University, Xiangtan Hunan 411105)

机构地区：[1]湘潭大学商学院,湖南湘潭411105

出　　处：《湖南财政经济学院学报》2020年第4期88-100,共13页Journal of Hunan University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年项目“面板数据众数回归的理论、算法及应用研究”(项目编号:71703140)。

摘　　要：近年来,经济中出现了明显的“脱实向虚”现象。在此背景下,利用2007-2017年沪深两市A股上市公司数据,实证考察了高管股权激励与企业金融化之间的关系,研究结果表明:对高管股权激励越大,越能够有效抑制企业的金融化趋势;高管的金融背景削弱了股权激励对企业金融化的抑制作用;分样本回归分析发现,高管股权激励对企业金融化的抑制作用在国有企业、融资约束较大的企业更加明显。机制检验表明,高管股权激励通过提高了企业的研发投入,从而抑制了企业金融化。In recent years,there has been an obvious phenomenon of"transforming from substantial to fictitious"in the economy.Under this background,using data of listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share market from 2007 to 2017 as samples to study the relationship between Equity Incentive and corporate financialization from a micro perspective.The results show that:The equity incentive has a significant negative impact on corporate financialization.Executive’s financial background weakens the inhibiting effect of equity incentive on the corporate financialization.Compared with state-owned enterprises and enterprises with fewer financing constraints,the inhibiting effect of equity incentive on non-state-owned enterprises and enterprises with lager financing constraints are more obvious.The further research shows that there is a significant mediating mechanism between the equity incentive and the financialization of enterprises,that is to say,the equity incentive for executives increases the R&D investment of enterprises,and thus reducing the allocation of financial assets and inhibiting the financialization trend of enterprises.

关 键 词：脱实向虚 股权激励 企业金融化 研发投入 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]