权益性超额薪酬、CEO权力强度与真实盈余管理  

Equity Excess Compensation,CEO Power Intensity and Real Earnings Management

作　　者：康进军[1] 孙文广 陈昭旭 范英杰[1] KANG Jinjun;SUN Wenguang;CHEN Zhaoxu;FAN Yingjie(School of Business,Qingdao University,Qingdao 266000,China;Department of Audit,Hisense,Qingdao 266000,China)

机构地区：[1]青岛大学商学院,山东青岛266000 [2]海信集团公司审计部,山东青岛266000

出　　处：《南京审计大学学报》2020年第4期29-39,共11页Journal of Nanjing Audit University

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(19BGL067);山东省社会科学基金项目(16CKJJ03)。

摘　　要：基于公司治理角度,以2011—2016年沪深A股上市公司非平衡面板数据为样本,分析了A股上市公司真实盈余管理水平是否受到高管团队权益性超额薪酬的影响以及CEO权力强度和内部控制质量对两者关系的调节作用。研究发现,高管权益性超额薪酬与真实盈余管理呈显著正相关关系,CEO权力强度能够显著加强权益性超额薪酬对于真实盈余管理的正向影响,而高质量的内部控制整体上能够抑制权益性超额薪酬对于真实盈余管理的促进作用。From the perspective of corporate governance,taking the non-equilibrium panel data of listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2011 to 2016 as samples,this paper analyzes whether the real earnings management level of listed companies is affected by the equity excess compensation of senior management teams,and the moderating effect of CEO power intensity and internal control quality on the relationship between them.The study finds that there is a significant positive correlation between executive equity excess compensation and real earnings management.CEO power intensity can significantly enhance the positive impact of equity excess compensation on real earnings management,while high quality internal control can inhibit the promotion effect of equity excess compensation on real earnings management.

关 键 词：权益性超额薪酬 真实盈余管理 CEO权力强度 内部控制 薪酬契约激励 有效契约观 盈余风险观 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理]