终极股东控股趋势能否提升绩效表现?——基于企业成长周期的视角  被引量:5

Can the Trend towards Ultimate Shareholder Ownership Improve Performance?Based on the Perspective of Enterprise Growth Cycle

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作  者:张力派 于文领 陈玲玲 ZHANG Lipai;YU Wenling;CHEN Lingling(School of Business and Management,Shanghai International Studies University,Shanghai 201620,China;School of Business,Nanjing University,Nanjing 210093,China;School of Economics&Management,Southeast University,Nanjing 211189,China)

机构地区:[1]上海外国语大学国际工商管理学院,上海201620 [2]南京大学经济学院,江苏南京210093 [3]东南大学经济管理学院,江苏南京211189

出  处:《南京审计大学学报》2020年第4期50-59,共10页Journal of Nanjing Audit University

摘  要:基于企业成长周期理论和各阶段现金流特征,以中国A股上市公司为样本,实证分析终极控股股东股权集中和制衡趋势对企业绩效的影响。结果表明:在企业初创期,提高股权制衡度可显著优化绩效表现;在企业成长期,强化股权集中能显著提高收益;在企业成熟期和衰退期,提高股权制衡度和强化股权集中均无显著效应。通过对比终极控股股东性质与股权集中度、制衡度的交互作用发现,企业的国有性质会降低股权集中度、制衡度对绩效表现的积极影响。Based on the theory of enterprise growth cycle and the characteristics of cash flow in each stage,this paper empirically analyzes the impact of the concentration of the ultimate controlling shareholder and the trend of checks and balances on corporate performance,taking China s A-share listed companies as samples.The results show that in the initial stage of an enterprise,improving equity checks and balances can significantly optimize performance;in the growing period of an enterprise,strengthening the concentration of equity can significantly improve returns;but in the maturity and recession periods of the enterprise,neither means has significant effects.In addition,by comparing the interaction between the nature of the ultimate controlling shareholder and the degree of equity concentration and checks and balances,it is found that the state-owned nature of the enterprise will reduce the positive impact of the degree of equity concentration and checks and balances on performance.

关 键 词:终极控股股东 股权结构 企业生命周期 企业性质 股权集中度 股权制衡度 

分 类 号:F276.6[经济管理—企业管理]

 

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