政府补贴对职工劳动收入份额的影响机制研究  

Study on the Influence Mechanism of Government Subsidy on Worker Labor Income Share

作　　者：柳学信[1] 张宇霖 LIU Xue-xin;ZHANG Yu-lin(School of Business Administration,Capital University of Economics and Business,Beijing 100070)

机构地区：[1]首都经济贸易大学工商管理学院,北京100070

出　　处：《软科学》2020年第8期65-71,共7页Soft Science

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(19BGL076);北京市属高校高水平创新团队项目(IDHT20180521)。

摘　　要：基于2003-2018年A股上市企业数据探究了政府补贴对职工劳动收入份额的影响。研究结果表明:①政府补贴有助于提高职工劳动收入份额;②政府补贴通过“政治许诺效应”和“融资效应”影响职工劳动收入份额;③政府补贴与职工劳动收入份额之间存在倒U型关系,当企业单位资产政府补贴大于0.26元时,政府补贴对职工劳动收入份额有挤出效应;④随着资本劳动比的提髙,政府补贴对职工劳动收入份额的提升作用减弱;⑤职工劳动收入份额在政府补贴对企业价值的影响中发挥了部分中介作用。Based on the data of a-share listed enterprises from 2003 to 2018,this paper explores the relationship between government subsidies and worker labor income share.Results showed that,government subsidies help increase worker labor income share.Government subsidies affect worker labor income share through"political commitment effect"and"financing effect".There is an inverted u-shaped relationship between government subsidy and worker labor income share.When government subsidy of enterprise unit assets is more than 0.26 yuan,government subsidy has crowding out effect on worker labor income share.With the increase of the capital-labor ratio,government subsidies have less effect on the increase of worker labor income share.Worker labor income share plays a partial intermediary role in the impact of government subsidies on enterprise value.

关 键 词：政府补贴 劳动收入份额 政治许诺效应 融资效应 企业价值 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]