基于委托代理理论的区域医疗资源共享研究  

Regional medical resource sharing based on principalagent theory

作　　者：宋晓庆 熊季霞 姚育楠 SONG Xiaoqing;XIONG Jixia;YAO Yunan(College of Health Economy Management,Nanjing University of Chinese Medicine,Nanjing 210023,China)

机构地区：[1]南京中医药大学卫生经济管理学院,江苏南京210023

出　　处：《医学争鸣》2020年第4期67-71,共5页Negative

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(71203101);江苏省“333高层次人才培养工程”资助项目(2016-2645);江苏省社会科学基金课题(18GLD011)。

摘　　要：分析我国区域医疗资源共享中各医疗机构之间的委托代理关系,以解决我国区域医疗资源分布不均衡以及群众的看病问题。通过建立委托代理模型,分析不同风险状态下和拥有不同医疗资源的医疗机构的激励措施。不同风险状态下的医疗机构参与共享的努力程度不同,并且拥有优质医疗资源的医疗机构看重社会利益的激励,医疗资源水平低的医疗机构看重经济利益的激励。政府要加强激励机制,医疗机构之间建立信任机制,鼓励医疗机构参与医联体建设和实现信息化的资源共享。This article aims to analyze the principal-agent relationship among medical institutions in the sharing of regional medical resources in China,and to solve the problem of uneven distribution of medical resources in China and the problem of people’s medical treatment.By establishing a principal-agent model,we analyzed the incentives of medical institutions with different medical conditions and different medical resources.The degree of effort of medical institutions participating in sharing under different risk states is different,and medical institutions with high-quality medical resources value the incentives for social interests,and medical institutions with less medical resources value the incentives for economic benefits.The government should strengthen the incentive mechanism,establish a trust mechanism among medical institutions,and encourage medical institutions to participate in the construction of medical associations and realize the information sharing.

关 键 词：委托代理理论 区域医疗 资源共享 激励机制 

分 类 号：R95[医药卫生—药学]