司法决策中的效用考量及其偏差控制  

The Utility Consideration and Deviation Control in Judicial Decisions

作　　者：王彬[1,2] WANG Bin

机构地区：[1]南开大学法学院 [2]南开大学人权研究中心(国家人权教育与培训基地)

出　　处：《暨南学报（哲学社会科学版）》2020年第8期65-74,共10页Jinan Journal(Philosophy and Social Sciences)

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目“司法决策中的策略行为研究”(批准号:20YJC820044);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金项目“联合国人权理事会普遍定期审议机制研究”(批准号:63192701)。

摘　　要：在新制度主义的视角下,以理性经济人作为法官人性预设,以制度行动者作为法官角色定位,能够揭示真实世界中的法官行为;结合中国制度语境的本土特征,则可构建针对中国法官决策行为的“效用函数”。在这一效用函数中,错案风险和绩效考核构成了影响法官效用的基本变量。在效用导向的制度激励下,法官将做出趋利避害的策略行为,导致决策行为的偏差。为此,应强化司法裁判说理,优化法官决策环境,确立正确的制度激励,从而对法官决策的行为偏差进行防范和控制。With the perspective of new institutionalism,taking rational-economic man as the supposition and institutional actor as the role for judges,the behavior of judges can be well explained in the real world.In the local institutional context of China,we can construct the“utility function”for Chinese judges’behavior.In this utility function,the risk of being punished for misjudged cases and the performance assessments constitute the basic variables that may affect the judge’s utility.For the utility-oriented institutional incentives,the judge may make the strategy to seek advantages and avoid disadvantages,resulting in the deviation of judicial decisions.Therefore,it is necessary to strengthen judicial reasoning,optimize judicial decision environment,and establish correct institutional incentives,so as to control the behavior deviation of judge’s decision-making.

关 键 词：效用函数 司法决策 法官行为 新制度主义 

分 类 号：D9[政治法律—法学]