感受质是宽的物理关系吗?——基于庞兹的论证和分析  

Is Qualia a Wide Physical Relation? ——Based on Pautz’s Argument and Analysis

作　　者：符彬 FU Bin(College of Economics,Fujian Agriculture and Forestry University,Fuzhou 350002,China)

机构地区：[1]福建农林大学经济学院,福建福州350002

出　　处：《山东科技大学学报（社会科学版）》2020年第4期1-7,21,共8页Journal of Shandong University of Science and Technology(Social Sciences)

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(15YJC720007)。

摘　　要：关于感受质意向论的讨论一直贯穿着内在论和外在论的争论。庞兹提出了一个基于内在论的论证,解释相同的外部输入,可能因内部感觉系统的差异,而导致不同的知觉经验。庞兹的论证过于依赖经验事实而受到泰的反驳。而泰的反驳并不是积极的反驳,因为没有构造任何可验证的认知解释。On the intentionalism of qualia, there has been a debate between internalism and externalism. Pautz presents an argument based on the internalism, showing that the same external inputs may lead to different perceptual experiences due to differences in internal sensory systems. Pautz’s argument relies too heavily on empirical facts so that it was refuted by Tye. It is argued that Tye’s rebuttal is not positive because it fails to construct any verifiable cognitive explanation.

关 键 词：意向论 感受质 内在论 外在论 

分 类 号：N301[自然科学总论]