企业社会责任报告强制披露对资产误定价的影响:信息揭示还是掩饰?  

Mandatory CSR Disclosure and Asset Mispricing:Information Disclosure or Disguise?

作　　者：许罡[1] XU Gang(Anhui University of Finance and Economics,Bengbu 233030)

机构地区：[1]安徽财经大学会计学院,蚌埠233030

出　　处：《经济与管理研究》2020年第7期61-76,共16页Research on Economics and Management

基　　金：安徽省社科规划基金项目“新时代实体企业金融化失衡问题及治理研究”(AHSKF2018D55);“基于演化博弈的政府行为不确定性与企业研发投资互动机制研究”(AHSKY2016D10)。

摘　　要：学术界对企业社会责任(CSR)报告强制披露的效果存在一定争论,2009年开始部分企业必须披露CSR报告的规则为研究其政策效应提供了准自然实验机会。本文以A股上市公司为样本,采用双重差分模型,检验CSR报告强制披露对资产误定价的影响。研究发现,CSR报告强制披露显著缓解资产误定价程度,具有信息沟通效应;经过稳健性检验后,结论依然成立。影响机制分析表明,CSR报告强制披露主要是通过降低信息不对称、增强会计信息质量的信息传导效应影响资产误定价程度。进一步分析发现,审计质量越高,上述缓解效应越明显;而在投资者情绪高涨期间,CSR报告强制披露则无法缓解资产误定价。There are disputes about mandatory CSR disclosure.The mandatory CSR disclosure implemented in 2009 provides a quasi-natural experiment to research its policy effect.Taking the listed companies as samples,this paper designs a difference-in-differences(DID)model to test the effect of mandatory CSR disclosure on asset mispricing.The results show that the mandatory CSR disclosure significantly reduces mispricing and exerts an information communication effect.After the parallel trend test,the placebo test and the PSM-DID model test,the results is still robust.The analysis of the influence mechanism shows that the mandatory CSR disclosure mainly alleviates the mispricing by reducing information asymmetry and improving the information transmission effect of accounting information quality.Further analysis shows that the higher the audit quality,the more obvious the mitigation effect;during periods of high investor sentiment,mandatory CSR disclosure fails to reduce mispricing.

关 键 词：社会责任报告 强制披露 误定价 信息不对称 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]