考虑服务质量差异和质量敏感的平台入侵研究  

Research on Platform Encroachment Considering Service Quality difference and Quality Sensitivity

作　　者：张翠华[1] 李春雨[1] 吕茹霞 ZHANG Cuihua;LI Chunyu;LV Ruxia(School of Business Administration,Northeastern University,Shenyang 110169,China)

机构地区：[1]东北大学工商管理学院,辽宁沈阳110169

出　　处：《工业工程与管理》2020年第4期77-85,共9页Industrial Engineering and Management

基　　金：国家重点研发计划(2019YFB1405302);国家自然科学基金资助项目(71371043,71771044)。

摘　　要：在渠道需求受服务质量差异和顾客质量敏感性影响的情况下,考虑平台商是否开辟自营渠道入侵供应商的网上直销渠道,建立平台基础决策模型和平台商入侵决策模型。运用逆向归纳法,得到不同情形下供应商和平台的最优决策和均衡利润,探究了质量敏感性和渠道竞争强度对决策和利润的影响。结果表明:缺乏质量的监管机制,顾客对质量重视度增加并不能激励供应商提升服务质量;随着平台入侵,渠道竞争加剧会增加供应链之间的内部损耗,降低供应链总利润;另外,非平台主导的供应链中,当平台入驻收费策略为内生变量时,入侵策略导致利润损失。Considering that whether the platform open up self-operated channels to invade the supplier′s online direct sales channels,demand was influenced by service quality diference and customer quality sensitrity.As such,the basic decision model and encroachment model of platform were established.Utilizing the backward induction,the optimal decisions and balanced profits of supplier and platform under different circumstances were obtained,and the impact of quality sensitivity and channel competition intensity on decisions and profits was explored.The results show that in the absence of quality supervision mechanism,service quality can′t be improved by increasing customer attention to quality.With the platform encroachment,channel competition strengthening would increase the internal loss between supply chains and reduce the profit of whole supply chains.In addition,in a non-platform-dominated supply chain,when the slotting charging strategy was an endogenous variable,the encroachment would result in profit loss.

关 键 词：服务质量差异 质量敏感 渠道竞争 平台入侵 

分 类 号：F27[经济管理—企业管理] F253[经济管理—国民经济]