公租房运营监管博弈和租金定价模型改进研究  

Research on the Operation Supervision of Public Rental Housing and the Improvement of Rent Pricing Model

作　　者：陈金海[1] 陈政 CHEN Jinhai;CHEN Zheng(Fuzhou University,Fuzhou 350108,China;China Construction Bank Co.,Ltd,Fuzhou 350009,China)

机构地区：[1]福州大学,福建福州350108 [2]中国建设银行股份有限公司,福建福州350009

出　　处：《工程经济》2020年第7期69-74,共6页ENGINEERING ECONOMY

摘　　要：本文基于公共租赁房运营难题,构建政府部门与私营企业或租户的监管博弈模型,得到不完全信息静态博弈下的混合战略纳什均衡解。求得政府监管部门与私营企业或租户的行动概率受监管当局的检查成本、违规罚款金额、政府的声誉损失、私营企业违规利润空间的影响。分析结果表明,政府加大惩处力度无法完全杜绝违规行为。考虑从公租房租金定价上,引入公租房PPP项目差别化定价模型,在此基础上通过改进甄别手段,以实现更公平有效的差别化定价,从根本上消除过大的溢价空间,减少公共租赁房运营乱象,降低租金耗散。Considering the difficult problems in public rental housing operation,this paper constructs a regulatory game model between government departments and private enterprises or tenants,and obtains a Nash equilibrium solution of hybrid strategy under the static game of incomplete information.Obtains the probability of government regulators and private enterprises or tenants subjected to the inspection costs of regulatory authorities,the amount of fines for non-compliance,the loss of reputation of the government,and the illegal profit margins of private enterprises.The analysis shows that the increasing punishment of government cannot completely eliminate the violation.Introduces the differentiated pricing model of public rental PPP project from the perspective of the public rental rent pricing,based on which achieves more equitable and effective differential pricing by improving screening means,fundamentally eliminates excessive premium space,reduces the public rental housing operation chaos,and decreases rent dissipation.

关 键 词：公租房 租金定价 监管博弈 混合战略均衡 

分 类 号：F40[经济管理—产业经济]