媒体关注抑制管理者投资迎合行为吗?——基于代理成本视角  

Does Media Attention Inhibit Managers’Catering Behavior of Investment?A Perspective of Agency Cost

作　　者：胡国强 甄玉晗 肖志超 Guoqiang Hu;Yuhan Zhen;Zhichao Xiao(School of Accountancy,Tianjin University of Finance and Economics,Tianjin 300222,China;School of Management,Sun Yat-Sen University,Guangzhou Guangdong 510275,China)

机构地区：[1]天津财经大学会计学院,天津300222 [2]中山大学管理学院,广东广州510275

出　　处：《会计与经济研究》2020年第3期16-35,共20页Accounting and Economics Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年项目(71502122);教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目(20YJA790023);教育部人文社会科学研究规划青年基金项目(14YJC630048);财政部“全国高端会计人才培养工程(学术类)”。

摘　　要：基于代理成本视角,文章实证考察媒体关注对上市公司管理者投资迎合行为的影响及其作用机制。研究发现,媒体关注能显著抑制管理者投资迎合行为,尤其是对股票高估引起的投资扩张;当管理者具有较强股权薪酬收益动机和控制权私有收益动机时,媒体关注的抑制作用更明显。进一步研究发现,媒体关注的抑制作用主要通过监督机制而非声誉机制实现;这一抑制作用仅存在于信息不对称程度较高、代理成本较严重的公司,且主要来自权威媒体和政策导向媒体的关注。研究还发现,媒体关注抑制了股票高估引起的投资过度,总体改善了投资效率。研究表明,媒体在抑制管理者基于自利动机的投资迎合行为中发挥了积极的治理作用,提高了资源配置效率。From the perspective of agency cost,we empirically examine the effect of media attention on managers’catering behavior of investment and its mechanisms.We find that media attention significantly inhibits managers’catering behavior of investment,in particular the investment expansion due to stock overvaluation.The effect of media attention is more significant for managers with stronger motivations of equity-based compensation and private benefit of control rights.We also find that the inhibiting effect plays through governance mechanism rather than reputation mechanism.Moreover,the inhibiting effect is more significant in firms with higher information asymmetry and higher agency costs,and is mainly from authoritative and policy-oriented media.Finally,we find that media attention significantly inhibits the overinvestment due to stock overvaluation,and improves the investment efficiency in general.In conclusion,our findings suggest that media plays a positive governance role in inhibiting managers’catering behavior of investment originated from self-benefit motivation,and thus improves the efficiency of resource allocation.

关 键 词：媒体关注 股票误定价 管理者投资迎合行为 迎合理论 公司治理 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]