基于看涨期权的制造商碳排放权交易策略研究  

A Research on Trading Strategies of Manufacture’s Carbon Emission Permit Based on Call Option

作　　者：刘名武 潘艳屏 LIU Mingwu;PAN Yanping(School of Economics and Management,Chongqing Jiaotong University,Chongqing 400074,China)

机构地区：[1]重庆交通大学经济与管理学院,重庆400074

出　　处：《工业工程》2020年第4期61-68,共8页Industrial Engineering Journal

基　　金：重庆市科委基础与前沿研究资助项目(cstc2018jcyjAX0137)。

摘　　要：针对碳排放权价格的不确定性,引入看涨期权策略,构建制造商主导的两级供应链博弈模型,利用KuhnTucker条件求解。比较制造商以即时价格与以期权购买碳排放权策略的决策。研究表明,制造商只以期权形式购买碳排放权。碳价格对碳排放权期权购买量影响较小。碳价格较大时,碳排放权期权策略下制造商利润比即时价格购买策略的利润高,零售商和供应链利润也会提高。当碳排放权期权成本小于阈值,制造商采用期权策略可实现供应链企业利润的改善。For the uncertainty in the carbon emission permit price,a call option on carbon emission permit trading is introduced,and a manufacturer-led two-level supply chain game model is built,using Kuhn Tucker conditions to solve equations.The decisions are compared between the current purchase strategy and the option strategy in supply chain.The results show that the manufacturer purchases carbon emission permit only in the form of the option contract.The options purchase quantity of carbon emission permit is less impacted by the carbon emission permit price.When the carbon emission permit price is high enough,the manufacturer’s profit under the option strategy is higher than that under the current purchase strategy,and the profit of the retailer and the supply chain are also increased.The option strategy is used by the manufacturer can improve the profit of supply chain enterprise when the options cost on carbon emission permit is lower than the threshold.

关 键 词：碳排放权 看涨期权 KUHN-TUCKER条件 

分 类 号：F224.3[经济管理—国民经济]