基于双边匹配-动态博弈的碳减排技术投资决策  

Carbon Emission Reduction Technology Investment Decision Based on Two-SidedMatching-Dynamic Game

作　　者：刘丽[1] 张再生[1] 王哲 LIU Li;ZHANG Zai-sheng;WANG Zhe(College of Management & Economics, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China;Business School, Nanjing Audit University, Nanjing 211815, China)

机构地区：[1]天津大学管理与经济学部,天津300072 [2]南京审计大学商学院,江苏南京211815

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2020年第8期20-26,共7页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(16BGL138);天津市科技计划基金资助项目(15ZLZLZF00370)。

摘　　要：在Cap-and-Trade规制下,本文通过匹配-博弈机制研究双寡头制造商(寡头)碳减排技术投资决策问题,考虑了碳交易(CET)过程。从纵向角度,构建寡头与碳减排技术供应商(供应商)的双边匹配模型,研究寡头最佳碳减排技术选择、供应商最佳投资者选择问题;从横向角度,以产量为决策变量,以供应商技术研发人员的努力程度为辅助变量,构建双寡头Stackelberg动态博弈模型,以确定最优产量和碳减排技术投资决策,有效实现碳减排。最后,通过数值模拟实验加以论证。研究发现,第一,寡头-供应商匹配对的整体期望效用与CET价格存在正相关关系;第二,寡头环境绩效对自身技术应用效率较敏感,而对对手技术应用效率不敏感;第三,CET实施与否会直接影响寡头-供应商匹配对效用最大化目标的实现。Under the Cap-and-Trade system,this paper studies an investment decision-making problem of carbon emission reduction technology(CERT)of duopoly manufacturers(oligo-manufacturer)based on matching-game mechanism,CET is considered.From the vertical perspective,a two-sided matching model between oligo-manufacturers and suppliers who provide heterogeneous CERTs is constructed,realizing the optimal CERT selection for oligo-manufacturers and the best investor selection for suppliers.From the viewpoint of horizontal,a dynamic Stackelberg game model is established,in which the production quantity is regarded as the decision variable,the effort level of the technical research and development(R&D)personnel of the suppliers as the auxiliary variable.We obtain the optimal joint production quantity,CERT investment and carbon emissions decision-makings.Finally,we offer some numerical simulation experiments to demonstrate the above arguments and find that,firstly,the total expected utilities of oligo-manufacturer and supplier matching pairs have positive linear relationship with CET price.Secondly,the environmental performance of oligo-manufacturers is more sensitive to the effectiveness of their own CERT applications than the effectiveness of rival.Lastly,compared with no CET,CET will create more utilities for the oligo-manufacturer and supplier matching pair.

关 键 词：CAP-AND-TRADE 双寡头 碳减排技术投资 双边匹配 STACKELBERG博弈 

分 类 号：F272.3[经济管理—企业管理]