考虑政府参与方式的供应链低碳商誉微分博弈模型  

Differential Game Models of Low Carbon Reputation Considering Government Participation in Supply Chain

作　　者：徐春秋[1] 王芹鹏 XU Chun-qiu;WANG Qin-peng(School of Management Engineering, Zhengzhou University, Zhengzhou 450001, China;School of Management Science and Engineering, Hebei University of Economics and Business, Shijiazhuang 050061, China)

机构地区：[1]郑州大学管理工程学院,河南郑州450001 [2]河北经贸大学管理科学与工程学院,河北石家庄050061

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2020年第8期35-44,共10页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71702172,71702174,U1604150);教育部人文社会科学研究基金项目(17YJC630183);郑州大学管理工程学院创新发展基金(20181201)。

摘　　要：低碳经济背景下,考虑到政府参与方式的不同,借助微分博弈研究供应链中长期合作(上游制造商减排和下游零售商宣传)提高供应链低碳商誉的动态博弈问题。分别构建了无政府补贴的分散式决策模型、有政府补贴的分散式决策模型、有政府补贴的集中式决策模型和政府干预下的双向成本分担契约模型,并进行求解分析。研究表明,后三种情况,供应链低碳商誉、制造商和零售商的努力程度具有相同的水平,且都高于无政府补贴时的情况;政府干预下的双向成本分担契约,政府无需提供补贴,也能达到有补贴时的效果;政府和作为供应链中博弈地位较高的制造商都更倾向于采取政府干预下的双向成本分担契约方式,而作为供应链中博弈地位较低的零售商更愿意接受有政府补贴的分散式决策方式;政府在选择参与方式时,应充分考虑供应链中企业边际利润的对比情况。最后,通过算例对模型进行了数值分析。In the context of low carbon economy,considering the different ways of government participation,this paper studies the dynamic game problem of medium and long term supply chain cooperation(emission reduction by upstream manufacturers and publicity by downstream retailers)to improve the low carbon reputation of supply chain by differential game.A decentralized decision-making model without government subsidies,a decentralized decision-making model with government subsidies,a centralized decision-making model with government subsidies,and a two-way cost sharing contract model under government intervention are constructed and analyzed.The research shows that in the latter three cases,the supply chain low-carbon reputation,manufacturers’emission reduction efforts and retailers’low-carbon publicity efforts have the same level,and all of them are higher than the situation of non-government subsidies;under government intervention,the government does not need to provide subsidies,but can achieve the effect of subsidies;both the government and manufacturers with higher game status in the supply chain prefer to adopt the two-way cost-sharing contract mode under government intervention,while the retailers with lower game status in the supply chain are more willing to accept the decentralized decision-making mode with government subsidies;The government should take full account of the comparison of enterprise marginal profit in the supply chain when choosing the way of participation.Finally,the models are analyzed by numerical examples.

关 键 词：供应链 供应链商誉 低碳经济 微分博弈 成本分担 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理] F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]