政府补贴下供应链合作减排与低碳宣传的动态协调策略  

Dynamic Coordination Strategy of Cooperation on Carbon Emission Reduction and Low Carbon Propaganda in Supply Chain under Government Subsidy

作　　者：王婷婷 王道平[1] WANG Ting-ting;WANG Dao-ping(Donlinks School of Economics and Management, University of Science and Technology Beijing, Beijing 100083, China)

机构地区：[1]北京科技大学东凌经济管理学院,北京100083

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2020年第8期52-61,共10页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目:碳交易机制下基于契约的闭环供应链决策研究(71871017);北京市教委社科基金项目:京津冀生鲜农产品协同物流视角下的技术创新、环境规制和经济效益研究(SM201910037004)。

摘　　要：基于微分博弈理论,研究由制造商和零售商构成的低碳供应链长期纵向合作减排、低碳宣传以及政府补贴问题。考虑到需求受减排量和零售商低碳宣传努力的双重影响下,构建了Stackelberg微分博弈模型。当政府对各决策下供应链成员提供相同补贴时,设计的利润共享契约实现了供应链利润的合理分配。设计的减排成本分担契约使得供应链利润得到Pareto改进,比较并分析三种模式下政府补贴率和供应链的均衡策略,并探讨了政府和供应链成员的交互影响。最后,对模型结果进行比较分析和算例分析,验证了结论的合理性。Based on the differential game theory,a long-term vertical cooperation on carbon emission reduction,low carbon propaganda and the government subsidy issues in a low-carbon supply chain comprised of a manufacturer and a retailer is studied.Considering that the demand is influenced by both the carbon emission reduction and the retailer’s low carbon promotion effort,this study establishes Stackelberg differential game models.When the government provides the same subsidy to the supply chain’s members in different decisions,the profit-sharing contract is designed to achieve the reasonable distribution of supply chain’s profits.Furthermore,the emission reduction cost-sharing contract is designed to realize the Pareto improvement of the supply chain’s profits,the government subsidy rates and supply chain’s equilibrium strategies are compared and analyzed in three modes.And the interaction between government and supply chain’s members is discussed.Finally,the comparative analysis of the model results and the numerical simulation analysis verify the rationality of the conclusions.

关 键 词：政府补贴 合作减排 低碳宣传 利润共享契约 减排成本分担契约 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]