高管薪酬结构调整与股价崩盘风险:“利益趋同”还是“堑壕防御”?  

CEO Compensation Structure Adjustment and Stock Price Crash Risk:Interest Convergence or Trench Defense?

作　　者：周蕾[1] 周萍华[1] 方岳 ZHOU Lei;ZHOU PingHua;FANG Yue(School of Accountancy, Anhui University of Finance and Economics, Bengbu 233030;School of Economics,Zhejiang University,Hangzhou 310058)

机构地区：[1]安徽财经大学会计学院,安徽蚌埠233030 [2]浙江大学经济学院,浙江杭州310058

出　　处：《财贸研究》2020年第8期87-98,共12页Finance and Trade Research

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目“会计信息质量、股票风险溢价与股价崩盘预警机制研究”(18BGL076)。

摘　　要：以2010—2017年我国沪深两市A股上市公司为研究对象,基于“利益趋同”和“堑壕防御”假说,考察高管薪酬结构调整对公司股价崩盘风险的影响。研究表明:当董事会能够对高管实施有效监督时,公司对高管薪酬结构进行调整有助于提升激励效率,促进高管与股东的“利益趋同”,缓解代理问题,促使会计信息质量提升,进而抑制公司股价崩盘风险;而当高管权力逐渐膨胀失去控制时,薪酬结构调整则可能是高管谋取私利进行“堑壕防御”的体现,这不仅无助于解决代理问题,甚至还可能成为代理问题的一部分,进而使公司股价崩盘风险升高。Taking listed companies from 2010 to 2017 in China as the research object,based on the theory of“interest convergence”and“trench effect”,this paper examines the impact of executive compensation structure adjustment on the risk of stock price crash.The research shows that when the board of directors effectively supervises the executives,the company’s adjustment of executive compensation structure means the improvement of incentive efficiency,realizes the“interest convergence”of executives and shareholders,alleviates the agency problem,promotes the improvement of accounting information quality,and then inhibits the risk of stock price crash.However,when the power of senior executives is gradually expanding and out of control,the adjustment of salary structure may be the embodiment of the“entrenchment defense effect”of executives seeking private interests,which cannot solve the agency problem,but also become a part of the agency problem,and even may push up the risk of stock price crash.

关 键 词：薪酬结构调整 股价崩盘风险 会计信息质量 高管权力 

分 类 号：F275.4[经济管理—企业管理]