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作 者:吴英垲 李一帆 颜贤斌 WU Yingkai;LI Yifan;YAN Xianbin(Beijing Jiaotong University,Beijing 100083,China;Southwestern University of Finance and Economics,Chengdu 611130,China)
机构地区:[1]北京交通大学,北京100044 [2]西南财经大学,成都611130
出 处:《情报工程》2020年第4期72-80,共9页Technology Intelligence Engineering
基 金:中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金面上项目人文社科振兴专项“新东方生态管理研究”(2019RW09)。
摘 要:基于企业生态学原理,在政府环境政策优惠下,构建企业竞合博弈模型,并对两类企业间的演化博弈均衡过程、演化稳定策略进行分析。研究表明,政府的环境政策优惠力度和对优惠的分配,均可以对各均衡点的演化稳定性进行控制;企业可以根据自身实力,在一定条件下,通过调整内部结构和优化外部环境,获得政府环境政策的支持。研究成果对政府利用环境政策引导企业绿色技术创新和企业争取政府环境政策优惠均具有应用价值。Based on the principles of corporate ecology,this paper builds the game model under government’s environmental policies for competition and cooperation among entrepreneurships,and provides analysis for the evolutionary game equilibrium process and evolutionary stability strategy between two types of enterprises.The study shows that the government’s environmental policy preferences and its distribution can control the evolutionary stability of each equilibrium point;enterprises can gain the government’s support according to their own strength and by internal restructuring and external environment optimizing.The research results are valuable for the government to apply the environmental policies to guide enterprises’green technology innovation and helpful for enterprises to strive for government environmental policies.
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