基于展厅服务的全渠道零售商微分对策研究  

Differential Game Strategy of Omnichannel Retailer Base on Showroom Service

作　　者：潘中玉[1] 庞海玲[1] PAN Zhong-yu;PANG Hai-ling(Liuzhou Railway Vocational Technical College,Liuzhou 545616,China)

机构地区：[1]柳州铁道职业技术学院商学院,广西柳州545616

出　　处：《数学的实践与认识》2020年第17期305-315,共11页Mathematics in Practice and Theory

摘　　要：针对存在消费者先通过展厅体验产品,转而到电子零售商购买的全渠道零售系统,分别构建垄断和竞争环境下的微分决策模型,探讨考虑展厅服务努力和渠道偏好的全渠道零售商和电子零售商动态定价策略.结果表明:长期的策略制定过程中,全渠道零售商服务努力、品牌形象、定价和利润均逐步提升,电子零售商定价和利润亦逐渐增加,经多周期调整,双方策略收敛于稳定最优值;竞争情形的全渠道零售商品牌形象、服务努力均大于垄断情形,但定价较低;较之全渠道零售商,电子零售商定价较高;面对偏好访问展厅以体验产品的消费者,双方均对倾向于自身渠道的消费者定高价,对倾向于竞争渠道的消费者定低价.Aiming at the omnichannel system where consumers first experience a product in the showroom and then purchase the product through the e-retailer,the this paper constructs the differential decision model under monopoly and competitive environments is also explores the dynamic pricing strategies of the omnichannel retailer and e-retailer with showroom service and channel preference.The results show that under the long-term strategy development process,the omnichannel retailers pricing and prfit have also gradually increased.After multi-cycle adjustments,the strategies of both parties converge to stable optimal value.brand image and service efforts in case of competition are larger than that case of monopoly,but pricing is lower.Comparing to the omnichannel retailer,the price of e-retailer is larger.Facing the consumers who have a higher preference for showroom,both parties set high prices for consumers who prefer their channels and low prices for consumers who prefer competitive channels.

关 键 词：全渠道零售商 电子零售商 展厅服务 微分对策 动态定价 

分 类 号：F724.2[经济管理—产业经济] O225[理学—运筹学与控制论]