实际上可知的反事实条件句  

Actually Knowable Counterfactuals

作　　者：苏庆辉[1,2] Chinghui Su(School of Philosophy and Social Development,Shandong University;Institute of Concepts and Reasoning,Shandong University)

机构地区：[1]山东大学哲学与社会发展学院 [2]山东大学概念与推理研究所

出　　处：《逻辑学研究》2020年第4期72-83,共12页Studies in Logic

基　　金：国家社科基金重大项目“广义逻辑悖论研究重大课题项目”(18ZDA031);山东大学国际科研合作种子基金(11090089395416)的阶段性成果。

摘　　要：可知性悖论是指:从检证论的论点"所有真理都是可知的"加上一些可信的假设,我们可以推论出一个矛盾。Edgington的解悖方案是将检证论的论点解读为"所有实际真理都是可知的",不过Williamson提出两个严重的批评:(一)诉诸实际性算子会使得检证论论点只涉及到必然真理;(二)反事实情境中的人不可能表达一个实际真理。基本上,这两个批评奠基在一个对实际性算子的立场上。近几年有些学者主张上述的立场是有问题的,并将实际性算子视为一个描述词。本文试图从这样的新观点来重新检视Williamson的批评,并论证存在实际上可知的反事实条件句。The so-called Paradox of Knowability is that we can derive a contradiction from the verificationist thesis,i.e.,all truths are knowable,with some plausible assumptions.Edgington’s solution to the paradox is to reinterpret the verificationist thesis as‘all actual truths are knowable’,but Williamson presents two serious objections:(1)the solution appealing to the actuality operator will confine the verificationist thesis to only necessary truths,and(2)the inhabitants in counterfactual situations cannot express any actual truth.In general,these two objections are based on a certain view on actuality operator,which is called into question by some people recently.They propose to take actuality operator as something like a description.The present paper attempts to reconsider Williamson’s two objections from this new viewpoint,and argues for the existence of actually knowable counterfactuals.

关 键 词：实际性 反事实条件句 可知性 

分 类 号：B81[哲学宗教—逻辑学]