避责与剩余控制权:决策避责类型及治理研究  

Avoidance of Liability and Residual REights of Control:Types and Governance of the Avoidance of Decision-making Liability

作　　者：许玉镇[1] Xu Yuzhen

机构地区：[1]吉林大学行政学院,吉林省长春市130012

出　　处：《政治学研究》2020年第4期27-37,125,126,共13页CASS Journal of Political Science

基　　金：国家社科基金重大项目“中国特色社会主义制度人民至上价值及其实践研究”(20ZDA004);吉林大学廉政智库创新团队建设项目“决策腐败及其责任追究——以我国党政决策体制为中心的考察”(2017LZZKY002)的研究成果。

摘　　要：近些年,地方官员渐渐出现了与以往“晋升锦标赛”建功作为不同的避责行为。行政决策领域中地方官员的决策避责呈现出隐蔽决策议程、偷换决策主体、空转决策程序、转变决策形态、自设决策责任等不同类型。从剩余控制权理论视角看其原因,主要体现在激励机制与目标替代、考核控制与任务冲突、职责同构与层层加码三个维度的内在矛盾性基于下级政府的剩余控制权而不断加剧。控制剩余控制权是治理地方官员决策避责的基本思路,具体包括准确界定剩余控制权的边界,完善决策程序和规范决策责任追究。In recent years,local officials have gradually begun to avoid liability,which is different from the previous“promotion tournament”.In the field of administrative decision-making,there are different types of avoidance of local officials,such as hiding decision-making agenda,changing decision-making subjects,idling decision-making procedures,converting decision-making form and setting up self-determination exception responsibility.From the perspective of residual rights of control,the reasons are that the internal contradictions of three dimensions are becoming more and more intense:incentive mechanism and target substitution,assessment control and task conflict,and responsibility isomorphism and layered increase.Controlling the residual rights of control is the basic idea to govern the local officials avoidance of decision-making liability,including three aspects:accurately defining the boundary of residual rights of control,perfecting decision-making procedures and standardizing decision-making liability.

关 键 词：剩余控制权 决策避责 治理 

分 类 号：F27[经济管理—企业管理]