制造商创新决策下的零售商信息共享策略  

Retailers'Information Sharing Strategy Based on Manufacturer's Innovation Decision

作　　者：胡华清 陈丽华[1] Hu Huaqing;Chen Lihua(Guanghua School of Management,Peking University,Beijing 100871,China)

机构地区：[1]北京大学光华管理学院,北京100871

出　　处：《工业技术经济》2020年第11期3-11,共9页Journal of Industrial Technological Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金“基于创新驱动发展的区域经济增长效率综合分析模型研究”(项目编号:71673011)。

摘　　要：本文通过构建由单个制造商和两个零售商组成的二级供应链,研究了信息不对称条件下的零售商信息共享和制造商产品创新策略,并分析了横向信息泄露和创新的纵向溢出效应对零售商信息共享决策的综合影响。发现在一定条件下,制造商进行产品创新能够激励零售商自发共享市场需求信息,尤其当制造商的创新能力较强时,两零售商即使在信息泄露的情况下也有动机向制造商共享市场需求信号,并实现供应链各成员期望收益的Pareto改进。当零售商没有动机自发共享信息时,制造商可以通过一定范围内的补贴进行激励,实现双方期望收益的提升。To study the strategies of retailers'information sharing and manufacturer's product innovation under asymmetric information,a two-layer supply chain model consisting of a single manufacturer and two retailers is established.We analyze the comprehensive impact of horizontal information leakage and vertical spillovers of product innovation on retailers'decision-making process.it is found that under certain conditions,manufacturer's product innovation can encourage retailers to spontaneously share market demand information.Especially when manufacturer's innovation ability is strong,both retailers have the incentives to share market demand signals with the manufacturer-even at the risk of information leakage-to achieve Pareto improvements in all members'expected benefits.When retailers do not have the motivation to share information,the manufacturers can motivate them through a certain range of subsidies to improve their expected benefits.

关 键 词：产品创新 纵向溢出 信息共享 信息泄露 补贴激励 PARETO改进 

分 类 号：F272.3[经济管理—企业管理] F224[经济管理—国民经济]