链与链竞争下闭环供应链中制造商纵向整合策略选择  

Forward or Reverse Integration in Competing Closed-loop Supply Chains

作　　者：石纯来 舒夕珂 罗明 聂佳佳[2] SHI Chun-lai;SHU Xi-ke;LUO Ming;NIE Jia-jia(S+chool of Economics and Management,Xidian University,Xian 710126,China;School of Economics and Management,Southwest Jiaotong University,Chengdu 610031,China;School of Economics and Management,Tibet University,Lhasa 850000,China)

机构地区：[1]西安电子科技大学经济与管理学院,陕西西安710126 [2]西南交通大学经济管理学院,四川成都610031 [3]西藏大学经济与管理学院,西藏拉萨850000

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2020年第10期92-103,共12页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71531009,71672153);四川省软科学研究计划项目(2016ZR0055);四川循环经济研究中心规划项目(XHJJ-1515);四川省社会科学重点研究基地四川省电子商务与现代物流研究中心课题(DSWL16-6)。

摘　　要：基于链与链竞争情形下,探讨了闭环供应链中制造商纵向整合策略选择。以制造商单位生产成本为基准,发现制造商不仅有动机整合正向物流或逆向物流,而且整合正向物流总是有利于增加其闭环供应链利润。若存在规模不经济,虽然制造商同样有动机整合正向物流或逆向物流,但是整合正向物流时闭环供应链利润是否高于其整合逆向物流取决于规模不经济系数。规模不经济系数较小时,制造商整合正向物流时闭环供应链利润高于其整合逆向物流;反之,制造商整合正向物流时闭环供应链利润低于其整合逆向物流。Remanufacturing is able to reduce resource assumption on the one hand;On the other hand, remanufacturing also can make the environment and society better by reducing the carbon emission. Hence, more and more governments require manufacturers to engage in remanufacturing. A classical closed-loop supply chain(CLSC) is a combination of forward distribution in which the manufacturer sells products through the retailer and reverse distribution where manufacturer collects used products via the recycler. Manufacturer as the leader can choose to integrate forwardly or reversely to enhance completive edge and achieves higher supply chain efficiency. For instance, Xiaomi, a leading Chinese smartphone maker, bought Youmi, a South Korean retailer, in 2017 to sell her products and expand her presence in South Korean. Reserve integration, as an alternative strategy, stretches a manufacturer’s operations towards the used-products collection, enabling the manufacturer to save cost. For example, Nike formed an alliance with National Recycling Coalition to collect used shoes, and firms like IBM, Dell, Huawei, and Haier established their own departments or branches to collect used-products. Based on the phenomena, some researchers like Nie(2012) and Ma et al.(2016) have made some analyses of the different cooperation in the CLSC. However, they all ignore the facts that competition is no longer firm against firm, but rather supply chain against supply chain as Ha et al.(2017) said.Motivated by the observation and literature, several interesting questions arise.(1)whether the manufacturer still has an incentive to integrate forwardly or reversely in compositing CLSCs?(2)Industry profit really benefits more from forward integration? To address the questions, we develop the model consisting of competing manufacturer selling her products through exclusive retailers, and collecting the used products via the exclusive recycler. We explore whether the manufacturer is possible to choose forward or reverse integration in competing CLSCs. W

关 键 词：竞争闭环供应链 正向物流 逆向物流 规模不经济 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]