提供补救服务情境下专家薪酬、服务优化对服务策略的影响研究  

The Effect of Expert Wages and Service Optimization on Service Policy When Providing Remedial Service

作　　者：李武强[1] 刘德智[1] 许晓晴[1] LI Wuqiang;LIU Dezhi;XU Xiaoqing(Chang’an University,Xi’an,China)

机构地区：[1]长安大学经济与管理学院,西安市710064

出　　处：《管理学报》2020年第10期1554-1563,共10页Chinese Journal of Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71701022);陕西省自然科学基金资助项目(2019JQ-500);陕西省社会科学基金资助项目(2018S38);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(300102239675)。

摘　　要：在面对面专家服务中,部分服务商为了提升顾客对服务的信心,针对服务失败提出了免费重新服务的补救方案,但这会增加系统负荷与等待时间;而高水平的专家虽然能提高成功率,但也会增加服务商薪酬支出成本。针对上述问题,基于排队论对提供一次、无限次补救服务两种方案进行研究,发现:①后者服务定价、期望等待时间更稳定;②当潜在需求较小时,两方案都随需求的增加提高了对专家能力的要求,当潜在需求足够大时,两方案的收益及其对专家能力的要求相同;③服务优化在潜在需求较小时能够节省薪酬支出,在潜在需求较大时提高有效需求。In order to enhance customers’trust in the quality of face-to-face expert service,many service providers have proposed free re-service schemes for their service failure,but this will increase the system load and waiting time;while hiring high ability experts can improve the probability of service success,it faces the challenge of paying a higher wages.In view of the above problems,two service recovery schemes such as providing one time(scheme 1)and unlimited times(scheme 2)re-service are studied based on the queuing theory,and the results show that:①the optimal price and expected waiting time of scheme 2 are more stable;②when the potential demand is low,both schemes will select a higher ability expert as the potential demand increasing;when the potential demand is large enough,the requirements of the two schemes for the expert’s ability are the same,and the service providers’revenues are equal;③service optimization can reduce wages expenditure when potential demand is small and increase effective demand when potential demand is high enough.

关 键 词：排队系统 服务补救 薪酬 服务优化 

分 类 号：C93[经济管理—管理学]