放宽反收购限制公告效应及其影响因素分析  

Effect of Relaxing the Antitakeover Restriction Announcement and Its Influencing Factors

作　　者：王凯[1,2] 茹思雨 孙国浩 WANG Kai;RU Siyu;SUN Guohao(Capital University of Economics and Business, Beijing 100070)

机构地区：[1]首都经济贸易大学中国ESG研究院,北京100070 [2]首都经济贸易大学工商管理学院,北京100070

出　　处：《首都经济贸易大学学报》2020年第5期79-89,共11页Journal of Capital University of Economics and Business

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年科学基金项目“创始人资源禀赋与反收购条款设立的双向影响研究:理论与应用”(71702114);北京市教育委员会社科计划一般项目“国有企业党委书记技术背景对创新效率的影响机理研究”(SM202010038015)。

摘　　要：近年来一些上市公司逐渐放宽了反收购限制,表现为降低董事提名权的持股比例和时间要求。本文手工收集2015—2018年发生的107起修改董事提名权的公告事件作为研究样本,采用事件研究法对中国上市公司放宽董事提名权限制后的资本市场反应进行实证研究。研究结果表明,放宽董事提名权限制后在事件窗口[-5,5]累计平均超常收益率显著为负,事件产生负面市场反应。通过回归分析发现,股权集中度会减弱负面市场反应,而管理层持股会强化负面市场反应。In recent years,some listed companies have gradually relaxed their antitakeover restrictions,which is reflected in the reduction of the shareholding ratio and time requirements of directors'nomination rights.This paper manually collects the data of 107 announcement events from 2015 to 2018 to modify the directors'nomination rights,and uses the event study method to conduct an empirical test on the capital market reaction of China's listed companies after relaxing the nomination of directors.The results of the study indicate that the cumulative average extraordinary return rate during the event window period[-5,5]is significantly negative after the relaxation of the directors'nomination limit,and the event has a negative market reaction.Through regression analysis,it is found that equity concentration will weaken the negative market reaction,while management shareholding will strengthen the negative market reaction.

关 键 词：上市公司 事件研究 公司章程 反收购条款 董事提名权 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]