大股东融资方式影响了企业创新吗?——基于股权质押的视角  

Does Financing Channels of the Largest Shareholder Affect Enterprise Innovation?——Evidence from Equity Pledge

作　　者：李姝[1,2] 翟士运 孙兰兰[3] 古朴 Li Shu;Zhai Shiyun;Sun Lanlan;Gu Pu(School of Business,Nankai University,Tianjin 300071;China Academy of Corporate Governance,Nankai University,Tianjin 300071;School of Economics and Management,Qingdao University of Science and Technology,Qingdao 266061;School of Economics and Management,Tsinghua University,Beijing 100084)

机构地区：[1]南开大学商学院,天津300071 [2]中国公司治理研究院,天津300071 [3]青岛科技大学经济与管理学院,青岛266061 [4]清华大学经济管理学院,北京100084

出　　处：《管理评论》2020年第10期120-134,共15页Management Review

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重点项目(16AGL006)。

摘　　要：本文以2007—2015年中国制造业上市公司为样本,探讨了大股东股权质押对企业创新的影响,以及在不同产权性质和不同经理人类型的企业中,两者的关系有何差异。实证研究发现,大股东股权质押期间,企业创新受到显著抑制,而且,相对于国有企业,非国有企业中大股东股权质押对企业创新的抑制作用更严重;相对于非纵向兼任经理人的企业,纵向兼任经理人的企业中大股东股权质押对企业创新的抑制作用更严重。本文的研究从股权质押的角度丰富了第二类代理问题的经验证据,同时,为越来越普遍的股权质押现象和处于转型期的中国经济提供了参考依据。Based on the theory of agency,this paper explores the impact of largest shareholder’s stock pledge on the corporate innovation and the difference of this relationship between enterprises with different property rights and enterprises with different manager types.As shown by the empirical evidences,it is found that the corporate innovation is significantly inhibited when the largest shareholder’s shares are pledged.Moreover,the influence of the largest shareholders’equity pledge in the non-state-owned enterprises is more serious than that in the state-owned enterprises.Compared with the corporations without affiliated management,equity pledge of the largest shareholder has more serious impact in the enterprise with affiliated management.This research enriches the empirical evidence of the second kind of agency problem from the perspective of equity pledge.Besides that,it also provides a reference for the increasingly popular phenomenon of equity pledge and the Chinese economy in the transition period.

关 键 词：股权质押 企业创新 产权性质 经理人类型 第二类代理问题 

分 类 号：F273.1[经济管理—企业管理] F425[经济管理—国民经济] F406.7