公司债务违约与审计师风险应对  

Firm Debt Violations and Auditor Responses to Risk

作　　者：文雯 冯晓晴 宋衍蘅[1] Wen Wen;Xiaoqing Feng;Yanheng Song(International Business School,Beijing Foreign Studies University,Beijing 100089,China;Business School,Renmin University of China,Beijing 100872,China)

机构地区：[1]北京外国语大学国际商学院,北京100089 [2]中国人民大学商学院,北京100872

出　　处：《会计与经济研究》2020年第4期3-23,共21页Accounting and Economics Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71472165);北京市社会科学基金项目(19YJC040);财政部“全国高端会计人才培养工程(学术类)”;中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金项目(2021JJ021,2018QD012);北京高校中国特色社会主义理论研究协同创新中心(北京外国语大学)项目。

摘　　要：基于手工搜集的1999−2017年中国沪深A股上市公司债务违约数据,文章从外部审计师风险应对视角,实证检验了债务违约的经济后果。研究发现,上市公司债务违约引发审计师采取风险应对措施,如增加审计投入、收取更高的审计费用、出具非标审计意见和拒绝提供审计服务。机制检验显示,债务违约引发审计师采取风险应对措施的主要原因是其增加了上市公司经营风险和审计风险。拓展性研究发现,公司债务违约问题越严重、出现财务困境的可能性越大,审计师采取风险应对措施的可能性越大;不同风险应对措施之间存在递进关系,即审计师会根据客户的债务违约风险大小,采取由弱到强的不同应对措施。Based on the hand-collected data of Chinese listed firms from 1999 to 2017,we empirically examine the economic consequences of firm debt violations from a perspective of external auditors.The results show that firm debt violations trigger auditor actions,including increasing audit investment,charging higher audit fees,issuing more stringent audit opinions,and even refusing to offer audit service.Channel tests reveal that debt violations increase firms'business and audit risks,and thus trigger auditor actions.Further analysis finds that auditors are more prone to respond to circumstances when firms'debt violations are more severe and the likelihood of financial distress is higher.In addition,audit actions are progressive.Auditors will take measures from weak to strong according to the risk of clients'debt defaults.

关 键 词：债务违约 审计投入 审计收费 审计意见 审计师变更 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理] F239[经济管理—国民经济]