高管薪酬攀比与企业并购  

Executive Pay Comparison and Company M&A

作　　者：罗宏[1] 秦际栋 LUO Hong;QIN JiDong(School of Accounting, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, Chengdu 611130)

机构地区：[1]西南财经大学会计学院,四川成都611130

出　　处：《财贸研究》2020年第11期97-110,共14页Finance and Trade Research

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重点项目“会计信息在宏观经济分析与预测中的应用价值及其实现方式研究”(16AJY004);中央高校基本科研业务费项目“员工持股计划与企业创新”(JBK180708)。

摘　　要：以2009—2016年我国沪深两市A股上市公司为样本,实证检验高管薪酬攀比的心理特征如何影响企业并购活动。结果显示,当高管上一期薪酬低于同行业可比公司高管薪酬越多,即高管受薪酬攀比心理影响越大时,企业本期进行并购活动的概率越高、并购规模也越大,并且这一关系在企业属于竞争性行业、非国有控股时更为显著。进一步分析发现,薪酬攀比心理推动的并购虽然可以提升高管的私有收益,但并不能提高企业的财务业绩与市场业绩。Using listed company data in China from 2009 to 2016,this paper studies how executive pay comparison influences company’s M&A activities.The study shows that the executives who are more influenced by the last period’s pay comparison,the possibility of corporate M&A in this period is higher and the M&A size is bigger.This relationship is more significant in the company which belongs competitive industry and non-SOE company.Further analysis has found that the executives gain benefits from the M&A activities,but it can’t improve company’s financial performance or market performance.

关 键 词：薪酬攀比 企业并购 并购规模 私有收益 

分 类 号：F230[经济管理—会计学]