基于消费者偏好的破坏性创新产品市场入侵策略研究  

The Disruptive Innovation Product Market Invasion Strategy Research Based on Consumer Preference

作　　者：李向东[1,2] 肖美玲 杨伯军 孙建广 LI Xiang-dong;XIAO Mei-ling;YANG Bo-jun;SUN Jian-guang(School of Economics and Management,Hebei University of Technology,Tianjin 300401,China;National Technology Innovation Method and Implementation Tool Engineering Technology Research Center,Tianjin 300401,China)

机构地区：[1]河北工业大学经济管理学院,天津300401 [2]河北工业大学国家技术创新方法与实施工具工程技术研究中心,天津300401

出　　处：《数学的实践与认识》2020年第21期25-38,共14页Mathematics in Practice and Theory

基　　金：科技部创新方法工作专项(2017IM010400,2017IM040100,2019IM050200);工信部工业互联网创新发展工程项目(TC19083W8);河北省高等学校社科研究年度基金重点项目(SD191017)。

摘　　要：企业对破坏性创新产品市场入侵模式的选择与消费偏好密切相关.从动态视角构建有限理性下破坏性创新产品市场入侵模式选择与消费者偏好之间的演化博弈模型,通过分析得出不同情形下创新企业和消费者的演化稳定策略,并采用Matlab软件对博弈推导结果进行仿真模拟,展示相关条件下消费者偏好与破坏性创新产品市场入侵模式选择之间的演化趋势和结果.研究结果表明,合作效益、破坏性创新成本、风险成本、政府激励是影响博弈双方稳定性的重要因素,研究为提高企业与消费者的演化稳定性提出了相应建议.The choice of market invasion mode of disruptive innovative products is closely related to consumer preference.From the perspective of dynamic intrusion pattern under bounded rationality and destructive innovation product market selection and evolutionary game model between consumer preferences,by analyzing the different situations the evolutionary stable strategy of innovative enterprises and consumers,and uses the Matlab software to carry on the simulation,the result of the game is to show consumer preferences and destructive innovation under the condition of the relevant product market evolution trend and results between intrusion pattern choice.The results show that cooperation benefits,disruptive innovation costs,risk costs and government incentives are important factors affecting the stability of both sides of the game,and corresponding Suggestions are put forward.

关 键 词：破坏性创新 消费者偏好 市场入侵模式 演化博弈 

分 类 号：F713.55[经济管理—市场营销] F273.1[经济管理—产业经济] F274