风险创业中的对赌机制及其风险识别——基于创业者保护的视角  

“Gambling Mechanism”and Risk Recognition in Venture Enterprises—From the Perspective of Entrepreneurs

作　　者：朱欣民 梅裔 Zhu Xinmin;Mei Yi

机构地区：[1]四川大学商学院,成都610064

出　　处：《四川大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2020年第6期185-197,共13页Journal of Sichuan University：Philosophy and Social Science Edition

摘　　要：风险创业中的创始人与风险投资方之间的创业绩效对赌,作为一项富有争议的金融合约机制,具有期权特性,发挥严格的下行风险保护作用,为风险投资方解决信息不对称问题提供了方案。虽然对赌促进了创业企业融资,在创业投资和企业并购中得到了广泛的运用,但实践中创始人对赌失败的案例却层出不穷,部分原因在于创业者对于对赌体系缺乏理解。我国常见的对赌类型包括上市对赌、股权方式的估值调整和现金方式的业绩承诺补偿,由于法律对于企业持续经营能力和其他权益所有者利益的严格保护,对赌的创业者承担了对赌失败的所有赔偿责任,在现金补偿的对赌结构中面临巨大的风险暴露,在股权调整的对赌结构中有失去企业所有权的风险;此外,对赌协议中环环相扣的投资退出保障机制,致使创业者难以保护自身合理诉求。对赌的严格的项目管理特质和创业企业的动态非均衡发展特点之间具有内嵌的矛盾冲突,而在业绩和时间对赌压力下创业企业资源和能力的不足,则是创业企业对赌失败的根本原因。目前的创业者面临着复杂的经营环境和激烈的市场竞争,采取外生性成长战略成为一种普遍趋势,创业者需要深入理解并主动参与对赌设计,促成投融资双方的资源整合和价值协同。As a controversial financial contract mechanism,“gambling mechanism”has been widely used in start-up ventures,corporate mergers and acquisitions.Many entrepreneurs fail in the“gambling”arrangement with their investors.Part of the reason is that entrepreneurs lack systematic understanding of the“gambling agreement”.Based on the theory of traditional venture capital contracting,this paper clarifies the definition,types and function of“gambling”from the perspective of entrepreneurs,analyzes the basic“gambling”payoff structure and the mechanism of investors exiting arrangement,and reveals the risks embedded in the mechanisms to entrepreneurs.In addition,this paper discovers the underlying cause of the failure of entrepreneurship to“gambling”.Today's entrepreneurs are facing complex business environment and fierce market competition,and adopting external growth strategies is becoming normal and necessary.To build a successful venture enterprise with the help of investors in the future,an entrepreneur needs to fully understand and effectively utilize the gambling mechanism.

关 键 词：风险创业 对赌失败 对赌机制 创业者保护 

分 类 号：F272.35[经济管理—企业管理]