“两标并一标”轨道交通PPP项目风险规避机制  

Risk compensation mechanism of rail transit PPP project under the mode of“Two Bids Merged into One Bid”

作　　者：李启东 庞明宝 LI Qidong;PANG Mingbao(School of Civil and Transportation,Hebei University of Technology,Tianjin 300401,China)

机构地区：[1]河北工业大学土木与交通学院,天津300401

出　　处：《铁道科学与工程学报》2020年第11期2962-2968,共7页Journal of Railway Science and Engineering

基　　金：河北省自然科学基金资助项目(E2015202266)。

摘　　要：研究“两标并一标”城市轨道交通PPP项目风险规避机制设计问题。在考虑多重信息不对称情况下,通过改进绩效考核体系设计风险规避机制,建立政府和施工企业参与的委托代理模型,采用遗传算法优化求解得到政府最佳绩效考核系数。结合实例采用二叉树法和蒙特卡洛模拟方法,研究客流量预测失准和建设成本超支风险存在对各方决策和收益的影响。结果表明采用本风险管理模式可有效减少各参与方的风险损失,为城市轨道交通PPP项目风险管理提供新的研究思路。The design of risk aversion mechanism for urban rail transit PPP project under the mode of“two bids merged into one bid”was studied.In consideration of multiple information asymmetry,the risk aversion mechanism was designed by improving the performance appraisal system.Then,the principal-agent model of government and construction enterprises was established,and the genetic algorithm was used to optimize the calculation to get the best performance evaluation coefficient of government.Combined with an example,this paper used the method of binary tree and Monte Carlo simulation to study the influence of the inaccurate passenger flow forecast and the risk of construction cost overrun on the decision-making and income of all parties.The results show that the risk management model can effectively reduce the risk loss of all participants,and provide a new research idea for the risk management of urban rail transit PPP project.

关 键 词：城市轨道交通 PPP项目 两标并一标 风险规避 委托代理 绩效考核 

分 类 号：F283[经济管理—国民经济]