检索规则说明:AND代表“并且”;OR代表“或者”;NOT代表“不包含”;(注意必须大写,运算符两边需空一格)
检 索 范 例 :范例一: (K=图书馆学 OR K=情报学) AND A=范并思 范例二:J=计算机应用与软件 AND (U=C++ OR U=Basic) NOT M=Visual
作 者:王义宝 高丹 原白云 WANG Yibao;GAO Dan;YUAN Baiyun(School of Economics and Business Administration,Chongqing University,Chongqing 400044,China;School of Management,Huazhong University of Science and Technology,Wuhan 430000,China;School of Business Administration,Henan Polytechnic University,Jiaozuo 454000,Henan,China)
机构地区:[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400044 [2]华中科技大学管理学院,武汉430000 [3]河南理工大学工商管理学院,河南焦作454000
出 处:《系统管理学报》2020年第6期1205-1214,共10页Journal of Systems & Management
基 金:国家自然科学基金资助项目(71502050);河南省高等学校重点科研项目(17A630022);河南省哲学社会科学规划资助项目(2018cjj080)。
摘 要:针对制造商在分担线下零售商促销广告成本的同时,还考虑参与网络零售平台合作广告计划的现实背景,运用Stackelberg博弈模型研究了双渠道供应链中的垂直合作广告问题。以单边垂直合作广告模型为基准,分别研究了双边垂直合作广告模型和考虑线下零售商公平关切的双渠道供应链合作广告模型。研究发现:网络零售平台的成本分担并不总是促进制造商全国性广告投入水平和整体利润的提升,当网络零售平台的分担比例较大时,制造商参与网络零售平台合作广告计划也有利于线下零售商利润的提升;线下零售商的公平关切行为特征会提升其促销广告的投入水平,但并不总能提升其感知公平效用;当制造商线下渠道的边际利润较大时,线下零售商过高程度的公平关切反而有利于制造商利润的提升。The vertical cooperative advertising problem in a dual-channel supply chain is studied by using Stackelberg game models,aiming at the realistic background that manufacturer shares the cost of offline retailer’s local advertising,taking into account the cooperative advertising plan of online retail platform.The bilateral vertical cooperative advertising model and the dual-channel supply chain cooperative advertising model considering the fairness concern of offline retailers are studied respectively based on the unilateral vertical cooperative advertising model.The results show that the cost sharing of online retail platforms does not always promote the improvement of manufacturer’s national advertising investment and overall profit.When the participation rate of online retail platforms is large,manufacturer’s participation in the cooperative advertising plan is also beneficial to increase the profit of offline retailer.The offline retailer’s fairness concern behavior will increase his/her investment in local advertising,but it does not always improve his/her perceived equity utility.When the marginal profit of manufacturer’s offline channel is large,the excessive fairness concern of offline retailer is conducive to increase manufacturer’s profit.
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在链接到云南高校图书馆文献保障联盟下载...
云南高校图书馆联盟文献共享服务平台 版权所有©
您的IP:216.73.216.180