劳动力市场管制与企业雇佣合同选择——来自世界银行中国企业调查的证据  

Labor Market Regulation and the Choice of Employment Contract:Evidence from the World Bank China Enterprise Survey

作　　者：张雪凯 宁光杰 Zhang Xuekai;Ning Guangjie(School of Economics,Nankai University;Business School,Shandong University)

机构地区：[1]南开大学经济学院,天津300071 [2]山东大学商学院,山东威海264209

出　　处：《经济科学》2020年第6期86-97,共12页Economic Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目“信息技术发展、技能转换与农村劳动力产业流向研究”(项目编号:71973081);山东省社科规划研究项目优势学科项目“信息技术发展对我国劳动就业及收入分配的影响研究”(项目编号:19BYSJ39)的阶段性成果。

摘　　要：在当前我国劳动力市场法律、法规不断完善的背景下,本文利用世界银行2012年中国企业营商环境调查数据研究了劳动力市场管制对企业雇佣合同类型选择的影响。研究发现:面对更严格的劳动力市场管制,企业会更多选择临时工合同以规避管制,虽然也会增加雇佣劳动力的总人数。进一步的研究发现劳动力市场管制并不会造成雇佣技能结构和性别结构的改变,但会降低员工培训比例。由于临时合同员工各项工资和福利更低,且企业对其人力资本投资不足,因此设计适当严格程度的劳动力市场法律、法规,更能兼顾企业和员工双方的利益,实现双赢。Under the condition of the continuous improvement of China’s labor market laws and regulations,this paper uses the 2012 World Bank business environment survey data of Chinese enterprises to study the impact of labor market regulation on the selection of employment contracts.The results suggest that enterprises facing strict labor market regulations will be impelled to choose more temporary contracts to avoid the regulations,although it will also increase their total employment.Further research found that labor market regulation will not cause changes in skill structure and gender structure of employment,but will reduce the proportion of employee training.Due to the lower wages and benefits of temporary contract employees,and insufficient investment in their training,designing appropriately strict labor market laws and regulations can better take into account the benefits of both the enterprises and the employees and achieve a win-win situation.

关 键 词：劳动力市场管制 雇佣合同 临时合同 

分 类 号：F247[经济管理—劳动经济] F061.2[经济管理—国民经济]