内部控制缺陷选择性披露的经济后果研究——“掩饰有效”还是“得不偿失”?  

Economic Consequences of Selective Disclosure of Internal Control Defects:“Coverup Works”or“the Loss Outweighs the Gains”?

作　　者：王俊韡[1] WANG Jun-wei(School of Accounting,Shandong University of Finance and Economic,Jinan 250014,China)

机构地区：[1]山东财经大学会计学院,山东济南250014

出　　处：《经济问题》2020年第12期81-89,共9页On Economic Problems

基　　金：山东省高等学校人文社会科学研究项目“上市公司控制权转移中的内幕交易治理研究——基于内部治理的视角”(J13WG78);山东省社会科学规划研究重点项目“实施乡村振兴战略的投融资机制创新研究”(19BJCJ63);山东省软科学基金项目“新旧动能转换背景下政府债务危机与融资风险分析”(2018RKB01475)。

摘　　要：企业披露的内部控制缺陷是向外部释放企业内部控制水平和会计信息质量的重要信号。以往研究大多基于"存在缺陷就真实披露缺陷",忽视了存在缺陷但不真实披露的情况。试图突破真实披露的前提假设,验证部分上市公司存在机会主义行为,会对内部控制重大、重要缺陷进行选择性披露(隐瞒或弱化)。而这种选择性披露会产生怎样的经济后果?研究发现:短期内,选择性披露并不能起到"掩饰"目的,与真实披露缺陷没有差异,都会引起显著的负面市场反应;长期内,选择性披露比真实披露缺陷承担更高的权益成本和债务成本,其他盈余及成长情况也会变差,选择性披露明显"得不偿失"。进一步研究发现,上市公司存在诸多驱动因素推动其进行选择性披露,诸如高管驱动、控股股东股权质押、企业所处行业竞争地位都对选择性披露产生了巨大的推动力。综合来看,当前中国的资本市场能感知到选择性披露背后的负面信息,选择性披露并不是明智的选择,真实披露缺陷将更加理性;建议制定更加详细的缺陷认定标准和披露规范,减少"选择性"披露的空间和途径;提示监管机构和利益相关者正确识别内部控制缺陷信息,引导企业真实披露内部控制缺陷,提升企业整体披露水平。The disclosure of internal control defects is an important signal to release the level of internal control and the quality of accounting information to the outsiders. Most of the previous studies assumed that "if there is a defect,it is true to disclose the defect",ignoring the situation that there is defect but not true disclosure. This paper attempts to break through the premise hypothesis of true disclosure and verify that some listed companies have opportunistic behavior,which will selectively disclose(hide or weaken) the major and important defects of internal control. What economic consequences will such selective disclosure lead to? The results show that: in the short term,selective disclosure does not realize"Make-up Works",and there is no difference with the real disclosure defects,which will cause significant negative market reaction;in the long run,the selective disclosure bears higher equity cost and debt cost than the real disclosure defect,and other earnings and growth will also become worse,and the selective disclosure is obviously"the Loss Outweighs the Gains". Further research shows that there are many driving factors to promote the selective disclosure of listed companies,such as executive driven,equity pledge of controlling shareholders,and the competitive position of enterprises in the industry. On the whole,China’s capital market can perceive the negative information behind selective disclosure. Selective disclosure is not a wise choice,and real disclosure defects will be more rational;it is urgent to formulate more detailed defect identification standards and disclosure standards to reduce the space and channels of "selective" disclosure;it also prompts regulators and investors to correctly identify the information of internal control defects;To guide enterprises to choose disclosure behavior rationally and improve the overall disclosure level of enterprises.

关 键 词：内部控制缺陷选择性披露 股票市场反应 权益成本 债务成本 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理]