具有自营平台的制造商与零售商的竞争与合作模型  

Competition and Cooperation Models of a Retailer and a Manufacturer Who Possesses a Direct Online Channel

作　　者：楼振凯 楼旭明 侯福均[1] 孙中原 Lou Zhenkai;Lou Xuming;Hou Fujun;Sun Zhongyuan(School of Management and Economics,Beijing Institute of Technology,Beijing 100081,China;School of Economics and Management,Xi'an University of Posts and Telecommunications,Xi'an 710121,China)

机构地区：[1]北京理工大学管理与经济学院,北京100081 [2]西安邮电大学经济与管理学院,西安710121

出　　处：《工业技术经济》2021年第1期144-150,共7页Journal of Industrial Technological Economics

摘　　要：本文研究了由1个制造商和1个零售商组成的供应链中的竞争与合作定价问题,其中制造商具有平台直销渠道。本文建立了竞争下的Stackelberg博弈模型,并分析了解的唯一性和合理性,然后给出合作定价模型和各渠道的定价策略,结果表明制造商和零售商最优策略是降低线下渠道销售价格而线上平台销售价格不变。通过对比表明供应链合作所增加的收益等于非合作下零售商的收益,并证明了顾客对线下渠道购买偏好越高,合作所增加的收益越大。进一步地,分析了在合作的情况下制造商是否放弃通过平台直销渠道销售商品的问题,并给出双渠道下供应链总利润比单渠道下总利润高的判定条件。最后给出一个算例,对所获得的结论进行验证和补充。In this paper,we consider competition and cooperation issues in a dual-channel supply chain involving a manufacturer and a retailer,where the manufacturer possesses and operates a direct online channel.For the competition model,a Stackelberg game model is constructed,and the uniqueness and the reasonability of all pricing strategies are examined.For the cooperation model,it is shown that the traditional channel will be lower than its sales price so as to enhance the total profit of the two-layer supply chain.The result reveals that the increased profit incurred by cooperation is equal to the profit of the retailer in the non-cooperation situation.Further,we demonstrate that the increased profit for the two-layer supply chain is higher when the consumers.preference for the online channel is higher.The issue whether the manufacturer would sell products through the online channel under cooperative situation is discussed.Finally,a numerical example is presented to make some supplements for the results obtained.

关 键 词：双渠道 竞争与合作 STACKELBERG 博弈 比例分配 供应链总利润 定价策略 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理] F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]