资源受限下的网络安全动态博弈模型  

Dynamic game model of network security under resource constraints

作　　者：鄂小松 石峻松 E Xiaosong;Shi Junsong(Tree Frog Information Technology (Nanjing) Co., Ltd., Jiangsu Nanjing, 210033,China;Nanjing Xin'aotao Electronic Technology Co., Ltd., Jiangsu Nanjing, 210039,China)

机构地区：[1]树蛙信息科技(南京)有限公司,江苏南京210033 [2]南京信奥弢电子科技有限公司,江苏南京210039

出　　处：《机械设计与制造工程》2020年第12期121-124,共4页Machine Design and Manufacturing Engineering

摘　　要：针对网络安全中攻防冲突双方信息获取不完整问题,在假定总资源受限的情况下,建立了网络攻防对抗博弈模型,提出了一种求解纳什均衡及代价函数的算法。通过案例,分析并验证了模型中纳什均衡的存在性及有效性。该方法可为不完全信息、资源受限情况下博弈过程策略选择问题提供借鉴。Aiming at the incomplete information for attack and defense in the network security,it establishes the game model under the assumption of the limited total resources,proposes an algorithm to solve Nash equilibrium and cost function.Based on the case it analyzes and verifies the existence and validity of Nash equilibrium.This method provides some reference for the strategy under the condition of incomplete information and limited resources in game model.

关 键 词：网络安全 动态博弈论 贝叶斯纳什均衡 代价函数 

分 类 号：TP393[自动化与计算机技术—计算机应用技术]