考虑消费者辨识能力的冷链博弈分析  

A Cold Chain Game Analysis Considering Consumer Identification Ability

作　　者：樊相宇[1] 刘智宝 武小平[1] FAN Xiangyu;LIU Zhibao;WU Xiaoping(School of Modern Posts,Xi’an University of Posts and Telecommunications,Xi’an 710061,China;College of Economics and Management,Xi’an University of Posts and Telecommunications,Xi’an 710061,China)

机构地区：[1]西安邮电大学现代邮政学院,陕西西安710061 [2]西安邮电大学经济与管理学院,陕西西安710061

出　　处：《工业工程》2020年第6期28-34,59,共8页Industrial Engineering Journal

基　　金：陕西省自然科学基金资助项目(2019JM-369);陕西省教育厅自然科学基金资助项目(18JK0705);陕西省教育厅人文社科基金资助项目(18JK0690)。

摘　　要：消费者辨识能力是指消费者对所购产品或服务品质的辨别能力。针对忽略消费者辨识能力将得出不准确结论,给决策者的抉择造成误导的问题,采用完全信息静态博弈方法,分别构建了政府、冷链产品企业和消费者之间的不考虑消费者辨识能力及考虑消费者辨识能力的混合策略博弈模型。通过分析Nash均衡解及期望收益,对比发现,忽略消费者辨识能力将低估政府部门的期望收益,同时对企业和消费者的期望收益也预估不准确。因此,在实际问题中应关注消费者对产品的辨识能力。Consumer identification refers to the ability of consumers to identify the quality of products or services they buy.In order to solve the problem that ignoring consumer identification ability will lead to inaccurate conclusions and misleading decision-makers’decisions,a mixed strategy game model between government,cold-chain product enterprises and consumers,which considers and which neglects consumer identification ability,is constructed by using complete information static game method.By analyzing Nash equilibrium solution and expected return,it is found that neglecting consumer identification ability will underestimate the expected return of government departments,and the expected return of enterprises and consumers is also inaccurate.Therefore,in practical problems,attention should be paid to consumers’ability to identify products.

关 键 词：冷链 博弈分析 消费者辨识能力 

分 类 号：F272.3[经济管理—企业管理]