基于博弈模型的组织内公共品自愿供给行为研究  

Research on Voluntary Provision of Public Goods within an Organization Based on Game Model

作　　者：廖玉玲[1] 宋美喆[1] 徐妙文 LIAO Yu-ling;SONG Mei-zhe;XU Miao-wen(Hunan University of Finance and Economics,Changsha 410205)

机构地区：[1]湖南财政经济学院,湖南长沙410205

出　　处：《财务与金融》2020年第6期72-75,共4页Accounting and Finance

基　　金：国家社会科学基金青年项目“惩罚机制下公共品自愿供给的组合性均衡评价及其实验研究”(17CGL056)。

摘　　要：组织内公共品供给需要其成员的自愿投入。本文建立了组织内公共物品的自愿供给行为模型,并以此为背景分析了组织内成员的供给决策。研究表明,组织内成员公共品自愿供给数量不仅随着成员收入的增加而增加,而且会受到公共品自愿供给弹性系数和其他投资供给弹性系数的不同影响。本文最后提出了以下建议:提高低收入人群的收入,合理控制收入差距,设立最低公共品供给数量来促进组织内成员增加公共品自愿供给。The supply of public goods within an organization requires voluntary input from its members of society.This paper establishes the voluntary supply behavior model of public goods in the organization,and analyzes the supply decision of members in the organization based on such background.Research shows that the voluntary supply of public goods by members of the organization not only increases with the increase in members’income,but also is affected by the elasticity coefficient of voluntary supply of public goods and other investment supply elastic coefficients.This paper recommended to increase the income of low-income groups,reasonably control income disparity,and establish a minimum supply of public goods to encourage members of the organization to increase the voluntary supply of public goods.

关 键 词：组织内公共品 自愿供给 博弈模型 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]