民营参股对国有上市公司薪酬契约有效性的影响研究  

The Effect of Private Shareholdings on Pay Performance Sensitivity in SOEs

作　　者：张伟华[1] 姚艺 牛伊宁 高冰莹 ZHANG Wei-hua;YAO Yi;NIU Yi-ning;GAO Bing-ying

机构地区：[1]北京工商大学商学院 [2]德勤华永会计师事务所 [3]中央财经大学会计学院

出　　处：《财务研究》2020年第6期26-36,共11页Finance Research

基　　金：国家社会科学基金十九大专项重大项目(18VSJ068);国家社会科学基金项目(17BJY211);国家自然科学基金面上项目(71672003);北京市属高校高水平教师队伍建设支持计划青年拔尖项目(CIT&TCD201804024)。

摘　　要：合理的薪酬激励制度是降低公司委托代理成本和管理层道德风险的重要手段,也是历次国有企业改革的重要内容。本文以A股国有上市公司为对象,研究民营参股对其薪酬契约有效性的影响。结果表明,国有企业引入民营股东能够显著提高其薪酬业绩敏感性,从而提高国有企业薪酬契约的有效性。民营股东提高持股比例以及委派董事能够显著提高薪酬业绩敏感性。进一步研究表明,控制链条较长的国有企业中,民营参股对薪酬业绩敏感性的提高作用更显著。本文的研究结论对深化国有企业混合所有制改革有一定的参考价值。The incentive system is an important mechanism for reducing the agency costs and solving management moral hazard problem. It is also an important content of the SOE reforms. This paper studies the effect of private shareholdings on pay performance sensitivity in SOEs. The results show that the private shareholdings in SOEs can significantly improve their pay performance sensitivity and improve the effectiveness of SOEs’ incentive mechanism. Moreover, increasing the shareholding ratio of private shareholders and appointing directors can significantly improve pay performance sensitivity. Further research shows that in SOEs with longer control chains, private shareholdings have more significant effect on pay performance sensitivity. The findings of this study have implications for deepening mixed ownership reform in SOEs.

关 键 词：国有企业 民营股东 薪酬业绩敏感性 混合所有制改革 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学] F275