不同主导模式风险厌恶零售商收益共享契约  

Revenue Sharing Contract for Risk-averse Retailers in Different Dominant Mode

作　　者：杜文意 DU Wen-yi(Business School,Jiangsu Normal University,Xuzhou 221116 China)

机构地区：[1]江苏师范大学商学院,江苏徐州221116

出　　处：《控制工程》2020年第12期2070-2076,共7页Control Engineering of China

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71702067);江苏省高校哲学社会科学研究项目(2020SJA1029);江苏省高校自然科学研究面上项目(19KJB120006);江苏师范大学优秀博士研究科研启动经费项目(18XWRS008)。

摘　　要：在供应商和零售商分别主导模式下,构建了基于风险厌恶零售商的两种博弈模型。分析发现,风险厌恶系数和收益共享比例对供应链成员的运营决策及利润影响不同。两种模式下,面对风险厌恶系数较高的零售商,供应商都会设置较低的批发价格;而零售商的订货数量,在供应商主导模式下随着风险厌恶系数的增大而减小,在零售商主导模式下随着风险厌恶系数的增大而增大;供应商的利润随着收益共享比例的增大而增大,零售商的利润随着风险厌恶的增大而增大。实践中,针对不同的主导模式,企业可以采取不同收益共享比例,从而最大化自身的利益。Two game models for risk-averse retailers in the mode of supplier and retailer dominance are constructed respectively.Through the analysis of the models,it shows that the risk aversion coefficient and the profit sharing ratio have different impacts on the operation decision and the profit of supply chain members.Facing the higher risk aversion coefficient,suppliers will set lower wholesale prices in both modes.The retailers’order quantity decreases with the increase of risk aversion coefficient in the supplier dominated mode,and increases in the retailer dominated mode.The supplier’s profit increases with the increase of revenue sharing ratio,and the retailer’s profit increases with the increase of risk aversion.In practice,according to different dominant modes,enterprises can adopt different proportion of revenue sharing to maximize their own interests.

关 键 词：供应商主导 零售商主导 风险厌恶 收益共享契约 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]